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Editorial 
Interaction of Science and Society
The last issue of STI-Studies (vol. 5, no. 2) contained two articles on mode 2 
issues, written by Janus Hansen and Monika Kurath, addressing the theoretical 
basis as well as the empirical foundation of this concept.
The editors of STI-Studies received a substantial number of comments on these 
two articles indicating that the mode 2 debate is still vivid – and that relevant 
issues still are contested such as the de-differentiation thesis or the question of 
legitimacy of public participation.
Following the two main articles of this issue, readers will find a discussion section 
with contributions of Laurens Hessels and Harro van Lente, Arie Rip, Peter Wehling, 
and finally two comments of Janus Hansen and Monika Kurath on each other’s 
article. All of them point to the value and the additional insights of the current 
debate, but also to some weaknesses of Hansen’s proposal to include systems 
theory as well as of Kurath’s attempt to measure social robustness.
The two main articles also refer to the interaction of science and society. In his 
paper “Emerging Technologies and Waiting Games”, Haico te Kulve presents a case 
study of institutional entrepreneurship and the evolution of rules and practices 
of using emergent technologies, such as nanotechnology, in the food packaging 
sector.
In their paper “Strategies for the Scientific Progress of the Developing Countries in the 
New Millennium”, Vuk Uskokovic´ , Milica Ševkušic´  and Dragan P. Uskokovic´  put 
forward the question, how developing countries can catch up or even leap-frog 
the leading states by mobilizing science – and at the same time avoid the pitfalls 
and risks of modernization which have shown up in many developed countries. 
Many thanks to Franziska Perlick for language assistance, Fabian Lücke for layout 
editing, and Jens Kroniger for web publishing.
Ingo Schulz-Schaeffer
Raymund Werle
Johannes Weyer
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Abstract
While nanotechnologies are expected to generate wonderful benefits for food 
packaging, there is reluctance in the uptake of these promises. Still, things are 
changing and there are dedicated attempts – by institutional entrepreneurs – to 
shape future embedding of these new technologies. Thus one can examine the 
evolution of sectoral changes before the actual introduction of new and emerg-
ing technologies, which is relevant for studies on emerging technologies and in-
dustrial change processes. The main question of this paper is how institutional 
entrepreneurship linking up with emerging nanotechnologies in the food pack-
aging sector has evolved and contributed to changes at the sectoral level. To 
do so, I mapped instances of institutional entrepreneurship and constructed a 
narrative of the evolution of these initiatives, taking a broad view of institutional 
entrepreneurship-in-context. I found a pattern of a succession of waves of initia-
tives which contributed to an evolving patchwork of rules and practices. This 
patchwork will, eventually, shape societal embedding of nanotechnologies in the 
food packaging sector.
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1 Introduction
While the improvement of food pack-
aging materials through nanotech-
nologies may seem straightforward 
as an innovation, fueled by the prom-
ises about nanotechnology since the 
late 1990s, it appears not to work out 
that way. A journalist who attended a 
nanotechnology and food conference 
in 2006 observed: “The food industry 
is hooked on nano-tech’s promises, 
but it is also very nervous” (Renton 
2006). Of course, the food sector is 
known to be conservative with re-
spect to new and emerging technolo-
gies, having had their setbacks and 
disappointments. Packaging might be 
considered as relatively safe, and has 
actually been identified as the most 
promising application area for nano-
technologies as to scale (Chaudhry et 
al. 2008).  But even in this area, actors 
are cautious.
One factor might be the structure of 
the food packaging sector, which in-
troduces complexities for the intro-
duction of nanotechnologies. The 
sector is the intersection of food 
product-value chains and packaging 
product-value chains. This intersec-
tion increases the variety of actor in-
terests and dependencies, and thus 
the occasions where actors wait for 
others to take initiatives. Definitely, 
the reluctance will be related to the 
uncertain uptake and societal em-
bedding (Deuten et al. 1997) of nano-
technologies by firms and other stake-
holders in the food packaging sector. 
The association with food introduces 
substantial challenges for embedding 
nanotechnologies for packaging, not 
just in terms of performance require-
ments, but also with regard to regula-
tory compliance and broader societal 
acceptance at the level of a sector. 
Still, things are happening. At the same 
time when the US National Nanotech-
nology Initiative emerged, Kraft Foods 
Inc., one of the largest food and bev-
erage firms in the world, established 
the Nanotek consortium. This consor-
tium aimed to link the development 
of food and food packaging products 
with nanotechnology research. Ac-
cording to the director of the consor-
tium, Manuel Marquez, Kraft wanted 
“to keep a leadership position in food 
science” (Gardner 2002a). Through 
its high visibility, Kraft’s Nanotek pro-
vided a model and legitimation for the 
combination of nanotechnologies and 
food packaging. 
However, Kraft’s initiative faded away 
for contingent reasons – but not the 
notion of promising nano food pack-
aging technologies. Other initiatives 
emerged that took up the concrete 
promotion of the combination of nan-
otechnologies and food packaging. 
This continued as issues of broader 
societal impacts and risks became 
important, attracting a wider variety 
of actors who attempted to promote 
rules and practices in order to shape 
the embedding of nanotechnologies 
in the food packaging sector. While 
the application of nanotechnolo-
gies in the food sector is still at an 
early stage and with only a few food 
& food packaging products on the 
market (Chaudhry et al. 2008), the 
overall situation at the sectoral level 
has changed through the promotion 
of these ‘proto’ rules and practices. 
Thus, sectoral changes can occur be-
fore structural changes in terms of 
product/firm entries or shifts in size 
and distribution of firms associated 
with particular products. How can we 
understand such sectoral develop-
ments in the food packaging sector?
Clearly, we have to include an insti-
tutional dimension. As Aldrich/Fiol 
(1994) emphasized, the development 
of new activities often faces a lack of 
legitimacy, resulting from ‘unfamiliar-
ity among stakeholders with the new 
activity and disputed conformity to 
existing institutional rules’. Embed-
ding new technologies in the sector 
then does not occur automatically, 
but requires the dedicated creation of 
legitimate new rules, which support 
development and introduction of new 
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technologies, through reducing un-
certainties. 
The dedicated creation of new rules 
and practices is what institutional 
entrepreneurs try to do. The concept, 
originally introduced by DiMaggio 
(1988), refers to actors who mobilize 
resources in order to create new insti-
tutions or transform existing institu-
tions, especially through tying dispa-
rate institutions together (Garud et al. 
2002; Maguire et al. 2004). As Garud 
et al. (2007) phrase it: institutions are 
patterns ‘specifying and justifying so-
cial arrangements and behavior, both 
formal and informal’. When taken up, 
these patterns become ‘the rules of 
the game’ in a sector. 
The concept of institutional entrepre-
neurship is useful to understand dedi-
cated attempts at creating new pat-
terns. However, it should be expanded 
to take into account the broad variety 
of actors that are likely to play a role 
in shaping the embedding of emerg-
ing technologies. Institutional entre-
preneurship, in the case of emerging 
technologies, will thus be distributed 
across a number of actors. In general, 
innovation processes have become 
complex and diffuse with a variety 
of actors interested in shaping de-
velopment and introduction of new 
technologies. For emerging technolo-
gies, such as nanotechnologies, in an 
early phase of development and with 
a strong open-ended character, pro-
cesses and effects of dedicated initia-
tives will be even more diffuse. 
This paper aims to contribute to the 
understanding of sector-level devel-
opments during an early phase of 
development of nanotechnology en-
gineered food packaging materials. 
The main question is: How does insti-
tutional entrepreneurship, linking up 
with emerging nanotechnologies in 
the food packaging sector, evolve and 
contribute to changes at the sectoral 
level?
To answer this question, I will first 
review institutional entrepreneurship 
literature relevant for my theme and 
expand on it for the purpose of my pa-
per. In addition, I need to develop an 
approach for identifying and analyz-
ing real time instances of institutional 
entrepreneurship, when it is not yet 
clear what the outcomes might be.
2 Distributed institutional en-
trepreneurship and sectoral 
changes
It is necessary to expand on the no-
tion of institutional entrepreneurship, 
as discussed and studied in the litera-
ture,  in order to capture the variety 
of actors involved in newly emerging 
technologies and their embedding in 
society, and the importance of antici-
pation and prospective coordination. 
This, then also allows me to indicate 
how to study such broader dynamics 
as real time developments.
2.1 Distribution of institutional 
entrepreneurship in a sector
The concept of institutional entrepre-
neurship builds on the concept of en-
trepreneurship, but foregrounds dif-
ferent types of change. Battilana et al. 
define institutional entrepreneurs as 
change agents, individuals or groups 
of individuals “who, whether or not 
they initially intended to change their 
institutional environment, initiate, 
and actively participate in the imple-
mentation of changes that diverge 
from existing institutions.”(2009, p. 
70) They add that the institutional en-
trepreneurs do not have to be success-
ful in order to be classified as institu-
tional entrepreneurs. They also argue 
that business entrepreneurs can act 
as institutional entrepreneurs, when 
they create new models diverging 
from the dominant business models, 
rather than follow these existing mod-
els. However, creating new business 
ventures is not an essential element 
of institutional entrepreneurship.
Studies in the literature have analyzed 
institutional entrepreneurship as a 
phenomenon in its own right, rather 
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than as part of dynamics at the sectoral 
level. Institutional entrepreneurship 
studies associated with technologies 
mainly focused on single instances of 
entrepreneurship (Hargadon/Douglas 
2001; Garud et al. 2002; Munir/Philips 
2005; Jain/George 2007). But to un-
derstand what is happening, we need 
to take into account a broad variety of 
actors in a sector that have an interest 
in promotion and/or control of such 
technologies – all of whom may act as 
institutional entrepreneurs.
Actors in a sector, including institu-
tional entrepreneurs, cannot move 
freely with respect to emerging tech-
nologies. They need to take into ac-
count the promises, and are subject to 
sectoral developments. Institutional 
entrepreneurs are enabled and con-
strained by sectoral structures (Garud 
et al. 2007). Garud and Karnøe (2003) 
emphasized the heterogeneous in-
volvement of actors in innovation 
processes and added structural fea-
tures when they spoke of ‘technology 
entrepreneurship as distributed and 
embedded agency’. Actors “become 
interwoven into emerging technologi-
cal paths that they shape in real time.” 
(Garud/Karnøe 2003, p. 281) Actors 
are also embedded more broadly 
within the sectors in which they op-
erate - relatively independently from 
particular paths. 
Thus, institutional entrepreneur-
ship, in general and with respect to 
new technologies, is distributed and 
embedded, cf. (Lounsbury/Crumley 
2007). Having recognized this, a fur-
ther step can be done: institutional 
change can also occur through or 
within spaces for interaction, in the 
sense that the actual dynamics are 
shaped by such spaces, e.g. a forum to 
promote a new technology, rather than 
the activities of individual institutional 
entrepreneurs. They can create new 
spaces (arenas, fora) for interactions, 
or exploit opportunities of spaces that 
emerge. Professional associations are 
one convenient venue for institutional 
entrepreneurship (Aldrich/Fiol 1994; 
Greenwood et al. 2002) and their con-
ferences may act as field-configuring 
events (Garud 2008; Lampel/Meyer 
2008). Consortia – with their meet-
ings and conferences – also provide a 
space. The Kraft-led Nanotek Consor-
tium in the food packaging sector was 
such a space, in which new relations 
between actors could be developed, 
connecting relatively disparate prac-
tices and resources. The configuration 
of a space and the variety of actors it 
is composed of then become impor-
tant: if more heterogeneous actors are 
involved, also more aspects of distrib-
uted innovation will be captured.1 In 
a sense, it is the space (and how it is 
used by a variety of actors) which be-
comes the change agent.2
Our understanding of institutional 
entrepreneurship as described, links 
up with criticisms of earlier studies, 
where institutional entrepreneurs 
are presented as “heroes who were 
disembedded from their institutional 
environment” (Leca et al. 2008, p. 5) 
It also moves on, by considering the 
complexity of enabling and constrain-
ing factors, (see also Maguire et al. 
2004; Dorado 2005; Battilana 2006; 
Leca et al. 2008). If we start with the 
basic point that actors who act as in-
stitutional entrepreneurs must pos-
sess (or acquire) sufficient resources 
to be productive in the particular 
situation,3 it is clear that when fields 
evolve (e.g. because issues such as 
regulatory and societal acceptance 
1  Such heterogeneous spaces may actu-
ally reduce the distribution of institutional 
entrepreneurship in terms of locations and 
separate activities as they may collect a 
variety of actor interests.
2  Consortia, especially when there is strong 
leadership, can also be conceptualized as 
institutional entrepreneurs themselves, cf. 
the notion of ‘collective institutional entre-
preneurship’ (Wijen and Ansari, 2007).
3  These resources can take shape in the 
form of legitimacy, such as formal author-
ity or leadership, their position in social 
networks, the ability to gather allies, co-or-
dinate collective action, access to and con-
trol of scarce resources (Leca et al. 2008).
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in the development and societal em-
bedding of new technologies become 
foregrounded in addition to expecta-
tions on economic prospects) the dis-
tribution of resources changes and 
thus the opportunities for institutional 
entrepreneurship. Thus, I expect that 
the type of actors more likely to take 
initiatives (and be productive) as in-
stitutional entrepreneurs will change 
over time. 
2.2 Sectoral changes associated 
with emerging technologies
New institutions give rise to new pat-
terns of behavior in a sector. ‘Patterns 
which have become taken for granted 
and act as stable designs for repeated 
activities of which deviation is difficult 
or costly in some manner’ (Garud et 
al. 2007). These patterns can include 
formal regulations, but also informal 
codes of conduct, norms and estab-
lished practices with routinized (and 
legitimate) ways of behavior – all 
‘rules of the game’. Through interac-
tions, orchestrated by institutional en-
trepreneurs, new patterns, and hence, 
new games can emerge. In the case 
of new and emerging technologies, 
for a long time, stabilization into pat-
terns will only be partial, as the devel-
opment will be fluid and open-ended, 
given uncertainties about future de-
velopments.4 
This is an important phenomenon 
to understand changes at the secto-
ral level. Changes in a sector of in-
dustry involve more than changes in 
competition and in exchange rela-
tions. Evolutionary economists have 
already discussed the importance 
of broadening the notion of industry 
structure and taking more actors and 
relationships into account, including 
non-market relationships and trans-
actions (Nelson 1995; Malerba 2002). 
Relevant actors in a sector include 
upstream and downstream chain re-
4  Further development of these ‘real world 
games’ (Scharpf 1997) for game theoretic 
purposes would require more work as out-
comes are unclear.
lations, customers, regulatory author-
ities, researchers and NGOs involved 
in this sector (Granovetter/McGuire 
1998), see also (Garud/Karnøe 2003) 
and (Scott/Meyer 1994). Anticipation 
on future relations between actors 
and technologies are particularly rel-
evant for emerging technologies and 
are by now part of how games are 
played in a sector.  
Expectations are known to play an 
important role in the dynamics of 
new and emerging technologies (Van 
Lente/Rip 1998; Borup et al. 2006). 
The anticipation on the embedding 
of new technologies helps to reduce 
the costs of learning by trial-and-er-
ror (Deuten et al. 1997). At firm level, 
firms can assess their future prod-
ucts’ conformity with existing regula-
tory schemes or the risk of rejection 
by public interest groups, and adjust 
product development strategies to 
have a better chance. At the sectoral 
level, uncertainties may lead to wait-
ing games, but are also fertile grounds 
for institutional entrepreneurship. 
Actors in a sector are aware of each 
other and more or less of their inter-
dependencies. Interdependent actors 
can hope that other actors will act to 
reduce uncertainties and thus wait 
before they themselves invest. Wait-
ing games are sometimes almost una-
voidable. A particular kind of institu-
tional entrepreneurship might arise, 
trying to break through the waiting 
games. This goal constitutes a collec-
tive good, so there will be reluctance 
to work towards it, while identifica-
tion with the promise of the new tech-
nology may be a positive incentive. 
Other considerations might also play 
a role, especially a possible lack of 
legitimacy in the introduction of new 
technologies, and the need to be clear 
about regulations that are applicable. 
This gives rise to new patterns, which 
pre-date the actual introduction and 
embedding of new technologies.
Adding such anticipation-oriented, 
“prospective” patterns to the broaden-
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ing already identified by evolutionary 
economists, it is clear that industrial 
structures are much richer than tradi-
tional industrial economics conceived 
them. Rather than developing this in 
more detail, I introduce the term ‘in-
dustry structure+’, as a reminder that 
the richness of industry structures has 
to be part of the analysis, especially 
when looking at sector-level changes. 
Embedded actors, including institu-
tional entrepreneurs, shape sector-
level dynamics related to technolo-
gies, but are also shaped by them. 
Sectoral structures and their asso-
ciated institutions with respect to 
technology development and their 
embedding in society co-evolve, and 
institutional entrepreneurship is an 
important part of the co-evolution 
(see also Nelson 1995; Malerba 2002). 
In a sense, institutional entrepreneurs 
are just as much a vehicle for change 
as independent change agents. One 
can even take a further conceptual 
step, and consider the occurrence 
(and nature) of institutional entrepre-
neurship as an indicator for emerging 
entanglements between technologies, 
industry structures and associated 
institutions, shaping industry struc-
ture+. Then, analyzing institutional 
entrepreneurship is a way to follow 
sectoral changes. 
What actors can do as institutional 
entrepreneurs, depends not only on 
their position, but also on develop-
ments with respect to institutionaliza-
tion of emerging technologies in the 
sector. Institutional entrepreneurship 
initiatives may build on such develop-
ments. Perkmann and Spicer (2007) 
already speculated on this aspect of 
distributed institutional entrepreneur-
ship in which an ‘institutional project’ 
may be pursued by various actors. For 
example, one individual may pioneer 
a novel institution, but it is taken fur-
ther, propagated by another actor. 
For the embedding of emerging tech-
nologies, the situation is more dif-
fuse. Institutional entrepreneurs will 
still build on earlier initiatives, but the 
overall effect is a patchwork of pro-
spective patterns at the sector-level 
rather than a specific ‘institutional 
project’.
2.3 Real time analysis of sectoral 
developments and institu-
tional entrepreneurship
For a new technology with only few 
concrete products, we are in an early 
stage of co-evolutionary processes. 
To understand what happens, trac-
ing ongoing activities and emerging 
patterns is important. Mapping even-
tual outcomes is not enough. Our en-
trance point is to map and character-
ize instances of entrepreneurship-in 
context. 
Instances of institutional entrepre-
neurship in relation to the uptake of 
nanotechnologies were identified by 
analyzing the positioning of actors 
in various texts,5 with supporting 
data from observations during meet-
ings and informal interviews. We col-
lected data from various sources.6 
I used the following criteria to identify 
5  The creation and circulation of texts is a 
key strategy in institutional entrepreneur-
ship (Munir/Philips 2005) and discursive 
practices are a central topic in entrepre-
neurship studies, (see Philips et al. 2004; 
Lawrence/Suddaby 2006; Leca et al. 2008).
6  I retrieved articles containing the terms 
nanotechnology and packaging that ap-
peared during 2005-2008 in a specialized 
online food magazine and a website fo-
cused on nanotechnologies in general: 
foodproductiondaily.com and nanowerk.
com. I attended various conferences: Min-
acNed seminar Food & Nutrition (Utrecht, 
2006), Packaging Summit Europe (Amster-
dam, 2007); final SustainPack conference 
(Prague, 2008); Nanotechnology and the 
Law: The legal nitty-gritty for nano foods, 
nanocosmetics and nanomedicine (Leu-
ven, 2008). Presentations of conferences 
were retrieved: Future of Nanomateri-
als (Birmingham, 2004); Nano4food 2006 
(Atlanta, 2006); Nanotechnology in Food 
and Agriculture (Washington, 2006); Food 
Packaging Innovations: The Science, Cur-
rent Research and Future Research Needs 
(Baltimore, 2006). Reports on and publica-
tions of identified instances of institutional 
entrepreneurship were consulted. In addi-
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institutional entrepreneurship: actors 
should be (1) mobilizing resources; 
(2) promoting the broad diffusion of 
rules, norms and practices related to 
nano enabled food packaging outside 
their own organization; (3) introduc-
ing ‘institutional novelty’, e.g. through 
combining disparate institutions, and 
or breaking with existing institutions 
in the food packaging sector. In addi-
tion, I collected and analyzed back-
ground information on developments 
in the food packaging sector in gen-
eral, and nanotechnologies in partic-
ular through reports, interviews and 
attending nanotechnology and pack-
aging conferences.
The research strategy of identifying 
real-time instances of institutional 
entrepreneurship (in context) and 
sectoral changes as they occur has 
limitations: it depends on what is visi-
ble. As nanotechnologies, and for that 
matter also sectoral changes, are still 
emerging, not all instances of inten-
tional and unintentional institutional 
entrepreneurship will be visible im-
mediately, while they could already 
have effects. Entrepreneurs can also 
dissemble strategically, downplay the 
radical nature of promoted new tech-
nologies and institutions in order to 
facilitate acceptance, and only later 
foreground the pioneering and radical 
aspects of their activities (Aldrich/Fiol 
1994; Hargadon/Douglas 2001). While 
this will occur, it is problematic for the 
heroes-and-winners narrative of in-
stitutional entrepreneurship (Leca et 
al. 2008). By focusing on interactions 
of actors and spaces as sites of entre-
preneurship, strategic dissembling is 
less of a problem in data collection.
An additional element to our mapping 
approach builds on the anticipatory 
activities of actors, how these enter-
tain possible futures, and how future 
developments are shaped already by 
present industry structure and the en-
trepreneurial activities of actors. Thus, 
controlled speculations about future 
tion findings were discussed with actors in 
the food packaging sector.
developments are possible, and these 
can be considered further data on sec-
tor-level change. In particular, as part 
of an interactive scenario workshop in 
February 2009 to explore future devel-
opments of nanotechnologies for food 
packaging technologies, we devel-
oped three scenarios, using as a base-
line a situation, which emphasized 
risk avoidance in the food packaging 
sector, with stakeholders waiting for 
each other to make a first move.7 Each 
scenario was constructed by envisag-
ing a particular type of institutional 
entrepreneurship trying to resolve this 
impasse.8 The scenarios will be used 
at the end of section 4 to discuss pos-
sible further developments.
3 The domain: nanotechnolo-
gies & the food packaging 
sector
Packaging is an omnipresent tech-
nology. Since the early 20th century it 
has become part of everyday life and 
subject of significant industrial activ-
ity. Nowadays, a wide variety of pack-
aging materials is used in different 
forms and shapes from basic material 
such as wood, plastics, textiles, paper 
and paperboard, as well as addition-
al materials such as inks and glues 
(Sandgren 1996). Global food pack-
aging sales were valued at US$ 168 
billion in 2003 and were expected to 
have grown to US$ 228 billion in 2009 
(World Packaging Organisation/Pira 
International 2008). 
3.1 Nano enabled food packaging 
technologies
Nanotechnologies are expected to 
have “the potential to transform food 
packaging materials in the future”. 
(Brody et al. 2008, p. 113) In their re-
7  The workshop was organized together 
with the Netherlands Packaging Centre, 
a ‘branch’ organization for the packaging 
value chain. Firms involved in food pack-
aging, interest groups, researchers and 
governmental agencies, attended. 
8  For a description of the scenario method-
ology see (Rip/Te Kulve 2008).
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view of the usage of nanotechnolo-
gies in the food sector Chaudry, Scot-
ter et al. (2008) identified four main 
applications for what they called ‘food 
contact materials’ (FCMs): FCMs in-
corporating nanomaterials to im-
prove packaging properties (e.g. gas 
barrier properties); active FCMs that 
use nanoparticles with, for instance, 
antimicrobial properties; intelligent 
materials, for tracking and tracing 
purposes or incorporating sensors to 
monitor food conditions; biodegrad-
able nanocomposites. Doyle (2006) 
identified additional application areas 
for nanotechnology such as pigments, 
inks and adhesives. 
The development of nanotechnolo-
gies for packaging is not totally new. 
High expectations of their application 
can be traced back to the 1990s. In 
particular, the development of nano-
composites received much attention 
(Manolis Sherman 2004; Lagarón et 
al. 2005). Nanocor, a supplier of na-
noclay additives, was established “in 
1995, after market research suggested 
that nanocomposites would be a bur-
geoning field” (Gardner 2002b). Na-
nocomposites are not only useful for 
packaging. As a set of enabling tech-
nologies they are expected to be use-
ful for a wide variety of products. At 
the end of the 1990s Sherman noted: 
“From auto parts to barrier packaging, 
the race is on to commercialize nano-
clay thermoplastic composites (Sher-
man 1999).”  
Approximately 10 years later, a rela-
tively small number of nanotechnol-
ogy packaging materials have en-
tered the market – although market 
estimates vary. Nevertheless, market 
studies and packaging experts expect 
a steep rise in introduction of nano-
technology & packaging products 
(Brody et al. 2008; Chaudhry et al. 
2008). In a report on the application of 
nanotechnologies in the food sector, 
the European Food Safety Authority 
(EFSA) referred to market studies that 
suggest that packaging will consti-
tute the majority of applications in the 
food sector and even make up 19% of 
nano enabled consumer products by 
2015 (Barlow et al. 2009). The report 
argued that the underlying dynamic in 
the growth of food packaging materi-
als is the expectation that these ap-
plications are not likely to have ‘any 
significant exposure to consumers’ 
due to the embedded or fixed nature 
of nanotechnology engineered mate-
rials in packaging applications. Sieg-
rist, Stampfli et al. (2008) also argued 
that the application of nanotechnolo-
gies for food packaging is perceived 
by consumers as less problematic, 
than their use for food.9 
Still, while the application of na-
notechnologies may seem to entail 
promising novel food packaging ap-
plications, the materialization of the 
promise is not straightforward. One 
reason is that risks of new nano-
technology engineered materials that 
come into direct contact with food are 
not fully understood. Furthermore, as 
we will see below, there is also the 
challenge of linking requirements of 
different players in a fragmented sec-
tor, which is generally cautious with 
respect to new technologies. 
3.2 Actors and their position with 
respect to new technologies 
in the food packaging sector
The structure of the food packaging 
sector is conducive to actors’ reluc-
tant uptake of emerging technologies 
such as nanotechnologies. What are 
the key players and their position in 
the sector? And how then does the 
overall situation in the food packag-
ing sector introduce challenges for 
embedding emerging technologies?
When discussing food packaging, it 
is somewhat misleading to talk about 
‘the food packaging industry’, as this 
would suggest well defined bounda-
ries to which actors begin and end to 
9  The food sector is known to be conser-
vative with respect to new and emerging 
technologies, while innovations are often 
related to packaging (Beckeman/Skjöl-
debrand 2007).
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engage in food packaging production 
activities. The development, manu-
facturing and use of food packaging 
takes place through a number of steps, 
which are spread across a variety of 
actors. For actors involved in packag-
ing, packaging is not likely to be their 
sole focus. Although material suppli-
ers may not always see themselves 
as part of the packaging sector (Pira 
International 2003), they are still rel-
evant, as they deliver the ‘innovative 
power’ for new packaging technolo-
gies (Prisma & Partners/MinacNed 
2006). With such qualifications, the 
packaging sector is a chain of actors 
involved in the development, produc-
tion and processing of packaging (cf. 
(Cottica 1994). Packaging is used for a 
number of products, food, but also for 
non-food items and pharmaceuticals, 
each of them having their own value 
chains. Thus, the food packaging sec-
tor is an intersection of the food and 
packaging chains. 
Characteristic for packaging is that it 
is not an end product in itself, but ‘a 
function to a product’ (Nieuwesteeg 
2007), such as protection of food or 
communication to stakeholders (e.g. 
of a preferred date for consumption). 
What actors consider valuable func-
tions of (food) packaging is different 
throughout the chain, what increases 
problems of co-ordination along the 
chain. For brand owners, packaging 
acts as ‘the silent salesman’ of their 
product, which is reflected in their 
attention to packaging design, and 
aesthetic aspects of packaging (Al-
franca et al. 2004). For retailers other 
functions may be (more) important. 
Whereas brand owners may favor 
novel sensors indicating food quality, 
such as freshness, retailers object to 
the incorporation of such sensors out 
of concern that consumers will only 
buy the freshest products.
A further challenge for coordinating 
the development and introduction of 
new packaging is the fragmentation 
of packaging knowledge, because 
relevant knowledge for packaging 
innovation is distributed across the 
sector. Brand owners value differ-
entiation through unique packag-
ing and increasingly take the lead in 
the development  and introduction 
of new packaging.10 They experience 
the fragmentation and cope with it 
by appointing packaging innova-
tion managers, who need to develop 
partnerships with other actors in the 
sector and specify requirements for 
novel packaging. Upstream actors, 
such as material suppliers, may have 
more knowledge of novel technolo-
gies, while downstream actors know 
more of consumer demands. Signals 
downstream may not always reach 
upstream actors and vice versa.11 This 
is another reason that actors may wait 
for each other to make the first step. 
As to the distribution of firm size, 
large firms can be found, although not 
exclusively, at the beginning and end 
of the food packaging chain:  Large 
packaging material suppliers, big food 
production companies (brand own-
ers) who ‘fill’ the packages and at the 
other end, large retail chains, which 
can take initiatives and set require-
ments. The room to maneuver for 
packaging manufacturers (so called 
‘converters’) is limited, as they often 
find themselves ‘squeezed in between’ 
their suppliers of materials, and their 
customers, such as brand owners and 
retailers (Pira International 2003). 
Retailers act as gatekeepers for new 
products. In interviews with experts 
in the food packaging sector, retail-
ers were identified as having a major 
influence in whether novel nanotech-
nology enabled packaging applica-
tions make it to the market, or not 
(Nanologue 2006). Uncertainty about 
retailers’ position with respect to nan-
otechnologies will then make actors 
10  Correspondence with J. van der Heide, 
Product & Market Development Manager, 
Corus Packaging Plus, 29th May 2008.
11  Based on observations and interviews 
during Packaging Summit Europe (2007) 
and Sustainpack (2008) conferences.
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While the notion of sustainability may 
create openings to introduce new ma-
terials, such as nanotechnologies, un-
certainties of their actual conformity 
to the (diffuse) notion of sustainability 
make actors reluctant. 
Uncertainties on the distribution 
of costs and benefits as well as on 
health, environmental & safety issues 
make actors across the food packag-
ing sector reluctant with respect to 
uptake of nanotechnologies.13 If I add 
this to my earlier considerations, it is 
not surprising that there are waiting 
games, where even big players are re-
luctant to innovate.  
Figure 1 offers an overview of the 
players in the food packaging sector. 
Additional players, such as suppliers 
specialized in inks, adhesives, ad-
ditives and  coatings; firms offering 
packaging machinery, design, testing 
and printing services; knowledge in-
stitutes and professional associations 
are shown as well.
13  Interview with Dr. G. Yilmaz, Agrotech-
nology & Food Sciences Group, Wagenin-
gen University and Research Centre, 02-
07-2008.
hesitant to initiate activities to intro-
duce such packaging materials.
As I have argued in the previous sec-
tion, for the development and em-
bedding of new technologies, non-
business actors, such as government 
regulatory agencies and civil society 
groups, constitute another significant 
set of actors, in general and definitely 
in the food packaging sector. Health, 
safety and environmental regula-
tions are important drivers in food 
packaging development (Sonneveld 
2000). Environmental considerations 
in general are prominent. Civil soci-
ety groups voicing (consumer) con-
cerns on impacts of food packaging 
on the environment have left their 
footprint on the packaging sector. 
Since the 1960s the sector, including 
governments, has taken a succession 
of measures to address concerns on 
packaging’s impact on the environ-
ment. Packaging firms have estab-
lished recycling programs, and prod-
uct stewardship programs have been 
launched (Lewis 2005). 
By now, sustainability is the buzz 
word in packaging conferences.12 
12  Observations during Packaging Summit 
Europe  (2007).
Packers, 
combing
packaging & 
content
Distributors
Supply chain
from
raw material
to producer
Producer of 
product to be
packed
(brand owner)
Retailers
Suppliers of 
packaging
machinery
Suppliers of 
packaging
materials
Packaging
Manufacturers
(converters)
Waste 
managers 
(recycling, 
disposal)
Consumers
Design & 
Services 
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Knowledge
institutes NGOs
Governments
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Table 1: Players in the food packaging sector
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Table 1: Overview and characterization of distributed institution-
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4 The evolving patchwork of 
embedding nanotechnolo-
gies in the food packaging 
sector
This section develops a narrative ac-
count of an evolving patchwork of 
initiatives and their outcomes over 
almost a decade. To start, I give an 
overview of the thrust and strategies 
of typical initiatives (Table 1). I char-
acterized their activities on the basis 
of some relevant literature showing 
that institutional entrepreneurship 
comprises three sets of activities: 
‘theorization’, i.e. the articulation of 
chains of causes and effects, of fram-
ing problems and justifying innova-
tions (Greenwood et al. 2002; Maguire 
et al. 2004), ‘resource mobilization’ 
and ‘implementation’ strategies and 
activities. In ‘theorization’, expecta-
tions play an important role in envi-
sioning new institutions (Garud et 
al. 2007) and in convincing others 
to adopt new institutions. While ac-
tors will possess some relevant re-
sources already, generally they need 
to engage in resource mobilization 
activities (Dorado 2005), enroll allies 
and create a better position for them-
selves. Depending on their position in 
the field (Maguire et al. 2004; Battilana 
2006) entrepreneurs have access to 
limited resources, and will therefore 
work with existing relations in the 
sector. By “linking the new practices 
to existing organizational routines 
[....] aligning them with the values of 
diverse stakeholders” institutional en-
trepreneurs are known to implement 
new institutions (Maguire et al. 2004). 
4.1 Early institutional entrepre-
neurship initiatives: promoting 
combinations of nanotechnolo-
gies and food packaging
My story begins in 2000 with the pro-
motion of nanotechnologies for food 
packaging applications, visible in nar-
ratives of expectations of new prod-
ucts with wonderful packaging prop-
erties.  This was the time of a steep 
rise in the interest in nanotechnolo-
gy.14 Governmental and commercial 
investments were increasing, and this 
was accompanied by a flood of publi-
cations on nanotechnologies’ revolu-
tionary potential (McCray 2005).
The first attempt to actively shape 
the embedding of nanotechnologies 
in the food sector was the establish-
ment of an international consortium 
of researchers and funded by Kraft 
Foods Inc., while at the same time 
the Clinton Administration presented 
the National Nanotechnology Initia-
tive to the US Congress. The consor-
tium consisted of physicists, chemists 
and engineers from universities, gov-
ernmental laboratories and start-up 
companies within the United States 
and Europe (Gardner 2002b; Goho 
2004). As a large collaborative net-
work researching the application of 
nanotechnologies in food and food 
packaging (Feder 2006; Berger 2008) 
and sponsored by one of the largest 
food and beverage firms in the world, 
the launch of the NanoteK consortium 
created legitimacy for the use of na-
notechnologies in the food and food 
packaging sector. 
While nano engineered packaging 
technologies were no new phenom-
ena (work on nanocomposites al-
ready existed since the 1990s), Kraft, 
in striving to be a leader in the field, 
provided the field with a new impulse, 
also because of their high visibility in 
the sector. The pursuit of novel com-
binations by Kraft became was ex-
pressed in an interview with Kraft’s 
vice-president of technology strat-
egy: “Finding technologies that are 
not obviously applicable to the food 
business is both a challenge and an 
opportunity that could help improve 
our products and packaging [....] For 
Kraft the consortium opens new ways 
of thinking.” (Fones 2005) The actual 
entrepreneurial action came from 
14  Nanotechnology is an ‘umbrella term’ 
covering a variety of technologies and 
research areas (Rip/Voß 2009), see also 
Wull weber (2008) on nanotechnology as 
an ‘empty signifier’. 
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Manuel Marquez, who became direc-
tor of the consortium. The consortium 
functioned as a space for interaction 
between different actors, and this was 
recognized by a participant: “Manuel 
has somehow gotten these people 
with many different areas of exper-
tise, and the consortium lets us inter-
act.” (Gardner, 2002) 
The promotion of the combination of 
nanotechnology and food packaging 
as a way of developing new packag-
ing technologies was also pushed in 
Europe. In 2002, the research institute 
STFI-PACKFORSK in Sweden started 
to prepare the Sustainpack project 
(Johanssen 2008). Although not the 
first consortium related to nanotech-
nologies and packaging in Europe, 
Sustainpack stands out in size and 
scope.15  Sustainpack claimed to be 
the largest packaging research pro-
gram in history with a budget of 36 
million euro, co-funded by the Euro-
pean Union. The four-year research 
project was launched in 2004, and 
was conducted by 35 partners, con-
sisting of universities, research insti-
tutes and firms including a large UK 
retail chain. Sustainpack’s institution-
al entrepreneurship is pronounced in 
their ambition to establish nano-en-
gineered fibre-based packaging as the 
‘industry standard by 2015’. 
To convince retailers, who act as 
gateway to consumers, was an impor-
tant feature in Sustainpack’s strategy. 
Sustainpack aimed to realize a stand-
ard “by creating a European research 
community focused on sustainable 
packaging which will pressure retail-
ers to accept natural packaging as 
the way forward (Nanowerk News 
2007b).” In this way, they also linked 
up with those retailers which were al-
ready prescribing the use of ‘sustaina-
ble’ or ‘green’ packaging technologies 
to their suppliers (Caul 2007; Wal-Mart 
2007). Analyzing attitudes of retailers 
and consumers to prospective food 
15  SOLPLAS, EU funded project ran from 
2002-2005.
packaging technologies was a further 
activity of the consortium (Østergaard 
2008). 
Sustainpack’s entrepreneurship dif-
fers from Kraft/NanoteK’s in the sense 
that it promotes a broad variety of 
products to be packed with new fibre 
based materials (and does so through 
addressing the packaging chain rath-
er than a set of food packaging prod-
ucts). Whereas Kraft emphasized the 
food safety benefits of novel nano-
engineered food packaging products, 
Sustainpack also emphasized broader 
benefits, i.e. desirable environmen-
tal aspects of their new fibre-based 
packaging materials. Sustainpack’s 
positioning derives from ongoing 
competition between plastic-based 
packaging industries and paper/card-
board packaging industries, and the 
discourse on sustainable packaging 
within the sector. 
By the mid 2000s there were still high 
expectations of nanotechnologies in 
general and for packaging in particu-
lar, but the overall situation in which 
actors contemplating nanotechnolo-
gies found themselves, was changing. 
The combination of nanotechnology 
and food packaging, and claims of 
their contribution to food safety and 
environmental impact, were now very 
visible in reports of industry observ-
ers such as PIRA International and 
Helmut Kaiser Consultancy (Moore 
2004; Anonymous 2005). At the same 
time, debates on possible risks associ-
ated with emerging nanotechnologies 
surged, notably when re-insurance 
company Swiss Re entered the stage 
in 2004 (Rip/Van Amerom 2009). This 
overall shift from high expectations to 
concerns about risks of emerging na-
notechnologies formed the backdrop 
to - and created openings for - new 
institutional entrepreneurship initia-
tives.
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4.2 Second round of initiatives: 
promoting and controlling 
combination of nanotechnol-
ogies and packaging
When the Sustainpack program was 
in its early years and Kraft/NanoteK 
continued its activities for some more 
time, a second wave of initiatives 
emerged. These pushed for the incor-
poration of broader societal and risk 
aspects in embedding nanotechnolo-
gies in the packaging sector.  
Interestingly, in this second round ac-
tors outside the food packaging sector 
were important. Actually, given the 
enabling character of nanotechnolo-
gies actors not involved in the food 
packaging sector might have been 
expected to come in early, spreading 
the good message, and incumbents 
to follow. However, as relative out-
siders they would not be able to be-
come (and be readily accepted as) in-
stitutional entrepreneurs. It requires 
a certain initial level of (perceived) 
legitimacy and/or reference to ear-
lier initiatives, for actors outside the 
sector to appear as institutional en-
trepreneurs. 
Actors in this second round turned 
out to comment on possible develop-
ments of nanomaterials, rather than 
only on the specific combination of 
nanomaterials for food packaging ap-
plications. Here, it is the open-ended 
character of nanomaterials and na-
notechnology as an umbrella term, 
which shape the emergence of insti-
tutional entrepreneurship activities 
within the food packaging sector. 
These entrepreneurs have a stronger 
technology-push or upstream focus 
than Kraft/NanoteK and Sustainpack 
(who already have a relatively strong 
technology push). 
One interesting institutional entre-
preneurship initiative from outside 
the packaging sector was pushed by 
the ETC Group. The ETC Group is an 
expert organization dedicated to sus-
tainability issues and marginalized 
groups (ETC Group 2003, p. 80). The 
ETC group picked up on the steep 
rise in interest in nanotechnologies, 
including Kraft’s NanoteK activities, 
during a time in which “civil society 
and governments [still] focus on ge-
netic modification” (ETC Group 2003, 
p. 5) In 2004 the ETC Group published 
a report in which they assessed pos-
sible risks of the application of na-
notechnologies for food and agricul-
ture, including packaging (ETC Group 
2004). They articulated concerns 
about the transfer of responsibility 
for food quality to consumers through 
the application of smart packaging 
(ETC Group 2004; Thomas 2006).  The 
ETC Group proposed the develop-
ment of new regulatory practices, up 
to a moratorium on nanotechnologies 
until these have proven to be safe. 
While ETC Group’s advocacy of new 
regulatory practices is broader than 
just food packaging, they played a 
relevant role as members of the ETC 
Group were involved in meetings 
on nano-engineered food and food 
packaging (Thomas 2006; Halliday 
2007). Next to establishing cognitive 
legitimacy of new regulatory practic-
es, they also aimed to push for new 
practices, such as through filing legal 
petitions. The ETC Group participat-
ed with Friends of the Earth and the 
International Center for Technology 
Assessment in ad hoc coalitions call-
ing for regulation of nanotechnolo-
gies (Thomas 2006; Nanowerk News 
2007a). Their entrepreneurship was 
mainly directed towards creating new 
framework conditions for further de-
velopment.
Actors in the food packaging sector 
now found themselves in a different 
situation, as promotion of nanotech-
nologies became subject of critique 
by NGOs and other actors such as re-
insurers, focusing on potential risk. 
New initiatives to promote develop-
ment of new packaging technologies 
with help of nanotechnologies need-
ed to take the strong debate on risks 
into account to maintain legitimacy.
Haico te Kulve: Emerging technologies and waiting games 21
This is visible in the initiative of a 
Dutch micro- & nanotechnology 
‘branch’ association called MinacNed. 
MinacNed’s primary mission is to 
stimulate economic activities based 
on micro- and nanotechnologies in 
the Netherlands, by developing and 
supporting networks, collaborations 
and identifying opportunities, using 
roadmapping as a tool (MinacNed 
2007). In December 2005 the asso-
ciation initiated the development of a 
Food & Nutrition roadmap, including 
the theme packaging. It articulated 
expectations of benefits of nanotech-
nologies but also discussed poten-
tial health, environmental and safety 
risks. 
MinacNed’s initiative can be seen as 
building upon the first round of ini-
tiatives. The eventual roadmap docu-
ment referred to an interview with a 
senior manager of Kraft in a newslet-
ter, who remarked: “We’re sponsoring 
research at these institutions to help 
us imagine the future of the food in-
dustry in the years ahead [...] We be-
lieve eventually nanotechnology may 
be a significant method by which we 
can deliver what consumers want.” 
(Prisma & Partners/MinacNed 2006, 
p. 27) The document also referred to 
the importance of sustainable pack-
aging materials and argued that 
plastic packaging can be replaced by 
bioplastics and cardboard packaging 
- reflecting the ambitions of the Sus-
tainpack project.16 
The roadmap initiative did not result 
in the formation of ‘innovative clus-
ters’ desired by MinacNed.17 During 
a seminar in which the roadmap was 
16  The Sustainpack program emphasized 
the importance of risk assessment too, but 
except for some mapping, no explicit risk 
research activities were carried out in ad-
dition to the technology development ac-
tivities.
17  There was an attempt to form such a 
cluster in the Netherlands, not initiated by 
MinacNed. Called Nano4Vitality, and aim-
ing at research and pre-competitive devel-
opment of new nano enabled technologies, 
it was co-funded by two Dutch provinces. 
presented, participants commented 
that it was very difficult to bring ac-
tors in the food industry together and 
that they would be hesitant with re-
spect to nanotechnologies. Potential 
participants were reluctant to take up 
nanotechnology projects. For them, 
both the feasibility and manufactur-
ability of these technologies was too 
uncertain.18 Actors waited for the 
availability of (large volumes of) na-
notechnology-engineered materials 
before they were prepared to invest 
in the development and marketing of 
nano-engineered products. 
Kraft’s move to the background as an 
institutional entrepreneur and thereby 
putting a partial end to the first round 
of initiatives, is a further indicator of a 
changing overall situation. Kraft dis-
tanced itself from the NanoteK con-
sortium by moving it to a subsidiary 
of Altria19 and the consortium was 
renamed, possibly out of concern for 
controversies about risks of nanotech-
nologies (Feder 2006). Researchers 
from Kraft attending conferences em-
phasized that Kraft was only exploring 
possibilities of nanotechnology, and 
would take great care when decid-
ing to introduce new nano products 
(Couttenye/Arora 2006). The overall 
climate in the food sector had become 
ambivalent about nanotechnology. 
This atmosphere is well captured in a 
phrase from a reporter attending a na-
notechnology oriented food & health 
conference (which I quoted already in 
the opening paragraph of this paper): 
“The food industry is hooked on na-
no-tech’s promises, but it is also very 
nervous” (Renton 2006).
Possible risks of nanotechnology-en-
gineered food packaging were now 
firmly on the agenda. Another wait-
It referred to the roadmap in their call for 
tenders (Nano4Vitality 2007). 
18  Interview by the author, 19th March 
2007.
19  The Altria Group, previously named 
Philip Morris Companies, was Kraft’s par-
ent company from 1988-2007, see <www.
altria.com>.
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ing game emerged, now between 
firms and regulatory agencies. While 
regulatory schemes were in place, 
the problem was concrete assess-
ments whether nanomaterials, in-
cluding food packaging, would pose 
unacceptable risks. This was not at 
all straightforward. According to the 
European Commission’s Scientific 
Committee on Emerging and Newly 
Identified Health Risks, but also to the 
European Food Safety Authority (risk 
assessment body food and feed safety) 
and US Food and Drug Administration 
(regulatory agency), more knowledge 
was required to develop risk assess-
ment methodologies to evaluate po-
tential risks of nanotechnologies (Sci-
entific Committee on Emerging and 
Newly Identified Health Risks 2006; 
Food and Drug Administration 2007; 
EFSA 2008). Firms in the food packag-
ing sector wanted to be assured about 
the safety of their nano-engineered 
products before market introduction 
and preferred clarity on the imple-
mentation of regulatory regimes.20 On 
the one hand, regulating authorities 
awaited products so that they could 
test their compliance with safety reg-
ulations. On the other hand, firms in 
the food sector had become increas-
ingly careful in mentioning their na-
notechnology-related activities since 
mid 2000s, see Berger (2008). Thus, 
firms and governmental actors were 
waiting for each other to make the 
first step. This waiting game formed 
the backdrop, and created incentives 
for new institutional entrepreneurship 
initiatives, to break through this wait-
ing game.
20  In 2007, the Grocery Manufacturers As-
sociation and the Woodrow Wilson Inter-
national Center for Scholars in the US took 
up this theme on a collective level and ini-
tiated a study to assess regulatory aspects 
and issues involved in nanotechnology-
engineered food packaging materials (Tay-
lor 2008).
4.3 Third round of initiatives: 
resolving the impasse
In the second half of 2000s a new 
round of institutional entrepreneur-
ship activities occurred, partly over-
lapping with the second round. Now, 
initiatives did not mainly focus on le-
gitimating the combination of nano-
technologies and packaging, but on 
how nanotechnologies in general 
should be developed and introduced 
on the market. While generic in na-
ture, the impact of these initiatives on 
the food packaging sector lies in the 
fact that actors involved in these in-
stances of institutional entrepreneur-
ship were also embedded in the food 
packaging sector. The effect of the 
new round of initiatives included the 
resolution of the impasse between ac-
tors in the food packaging sector, al-
though these initiatives often did not 
position themselves explicitly with 
respect to the food packaging sector. 
All these initiatives had in common 
that they articulated general rules of 
behavior and ways of dealing with 
uncertainties about benefits and po-
tential risks of nanotechnologies. Of-
ten they were framed as bridging a 
gap, proposing temporary measures 
until more certainty on risks and im-
plementation of regulatory schemes 
existed. A common thread in these 
initiatives is that they promoted in-
teractions between actors at different 
positions in the food packaging sector 
and/or promoted taking into account 
broader societal aspects. 
One such initiative explicitly aiming 
to address the general impasse is the 
institutional entrepreneurship activity 
of DuPont together with Environmen-
tal Defense.  Already in 2005, DuPont 
and Environmental Defense published 
an article, which discussed the need 
for more research and regulatory 
practices related to potential risks of 
nanotechnologies (Krupp/Holliday 
2007). They compared nanotechnolo-
gies with earlier emerging technolo-
gies, which had unintended effects, 
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such as the impact of the release of 
CFCs on the ozone layer. In their advo-
cacy piece they argued that early as-
sessment of possible risks and enact-
ment of safety standards can “reap the 
benefits while minimizing the risks.” 
DuPont and Environmental Defense 
called for ‘a collaborative effort’ be-
tween firms, academia, governments 
and public interest groups that “could 
set interim standards for nanotechnol-
ogy around the world while regula-
tions are under development.”  Later, 
their ‘collaborative effort’ would meet 
resistance by NGOs, exactly because 
of the ‘interim’ character of their ap-
proach (Civil Society-Labor Coalition 
2007). 
In 2007 they launched their Risk 
Framework ‘offering guidance on risk 
evaluation and management, and 
communication with stakeholders’ 
(Environmental Defense-Dupont Nano 
Partnership 2007, 14). The alliance did 
not position itself with respect to the 
food packaging sector due to the ge-
neric rather than specific nature of their 
risk framework, but one of the cases 
they used to ‘test’ the framework was 
a new titanium dioxide-based product 
to protect plastics from sunlight caus-
ing changes in color of plastic packag-
ing (ElAmin 2007). They definitely had 
impact on the food packaging sector, 
also because the partnership believed 
that the framework could support a 
model for government policy on na-
notechnology safety. 
Governmental authorities also became 
entrepreneurial by trying to resolve 
the impasse through voluntary meas-
ures rather than top-down policy mak-
ing. The Department for Environment, 
Food and Rural Affairs (DEFRA) in the 
UK was pro-active concerning the 
uncertainties associated with health 
and environmental safety issues of 
nanomaterials (including packaging), 
through launching a voluntary report-
ing scheme.21 
21 The US’s Environmental Protection 
Agency (EPA) launched its own voluntary 
The occasion was provided by the UK 
Food Standards Agency (FSA) 2006 
Report, which argued that although 
there were no major gaps in regula-
tions, there nevertheless existed gaps 
with respect to risk assessment and 
information of manufactured nano-
technology products (Food Standards 
Agency 2006). Following the FSA, DE-
FRA launched a voluntary scheme in 
September 2006, a form of ‘soft law’ 
(Dorbeck-Jung 2007), to provide the 
UK government with information on 
properties and characteristics of new 
‘free’ nano-engineered materials. In 
particularly it was expected to gener-
ate information to test existing regula-
tory measures. In this way, UK DEFRA 
aimed to bridge the gap between firms 
and regulators, with respect to uncer-
tainties related to compliance with 
regulations. Responses to the scheme 
were relatively low and UK DEFRA 
had to put effort in getting responses. 
In March 2008 the UK Minister for En-
vironment concluded that responses 
were disappointing and urged firms 
and researchers to commit to the 
scheme. The UK Minister hinted that 
more compulsory measures would be 
necessary when there was too little 
commitment to the scheme (Woolas 
2008).22
A simultaneous approach to cope 
with uncertainties associated with 
risks of nanotechnology and imple-
mentation of regulatory frameworks 
was the development and promotion 
of voluntary codes of conduct.23 One 
distributed institutional entrepreneur-
ship initiative also relevant for the 
food packaging sector was set up by 
the UK Royal Society, Insight Invest-
ment and the Nanotechnology Indus-
‘stewardship program’ in 2008 (Environ-
mental Protection Agency 2008).
22  By July 2008 the EPA schema had also 
received limited responses. Interestingly, 
some branch organizations recognizing 
the importance of the scheme for the cred-
ibility of the nanotechnology sector, tried 
to push their members to participate, see 
(Kearnes/Rip 2009).
23  See also (Bowman/Hodge 2008).
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tries Association. In the preparation, 
health, environmental and safety is-
sues, regulation and voluntary report-
ing schemes, but also views put for-
ward by NGOs such as the ETC group 
were topics for discussion (Sutcliffe/
Hodgson 2006). One of the identified 
gaps was that businesses were too lit-
tle involved in risk assessment devel-
opments (Royal Society et al. 2006). A 
working party was set up, which in-
cluded actors from the food packag-
ing sector: BASF (material supplier), 
Tesco (retailer) and Unilever (brand 
owner). The working party developed 
a code of conduct to bridge a ‘transi-
tional period’, before there would be 
more certainty on implementation 
of regulatory frameworks. The code 
promoted a pro-active approach from 
companies towards assessing and 
mitigating possible risks of nanotech-
nologies, including the involvement 
of stakeholders (Responsible NanoC-
ode 2008). 
In 2008, the Swiss retailers organiza-
tion IG DHS launched, in co-operation 
with a risk management consultancy, 
a code of conduct related to the ap-
plication of nanotechnologies in food 
and food packaging (Jones 2008). One 
reason to launch such an initiative 
was that the Swiss federal govern-
ment was working on a risk assess-
ment and management framework, 
but in the meantime relied upon the 
responsible behavior of producers. 
They also referred to NGO viewpoints, 
such as articulated by the ETC Group 
and Friends of the Earth (Miller/Sen-
jen 2008) regarding mandatory la-
beling of nano engineered products. 
Interestingly, IG DHS was explicitly 
referring to consumers’ concerns. The 
association argued that Swiss con-
sumers valued product information 
and that local retailers were in favor of 
labeling of nanoproducts. As retailers 
could not achieve this by themselves 
and needed co-operation across the 
food and packaging chains, a code 
of conduct could function as a tool 
to achieve this. The code obliged re-
tailers to “require producers and sup-
pliers to provide all the information 
necessary for assessing the safety of 
a product.” (IG DHS 2008) IG-DHS was 
weaving another piece in the patch-
work of emerging institutions.
While new initiatives emerged, other 
activities ended. In 2008, Sustainpack, 
one of the early entrepreneurial ini-
tiatives ended its activities. While the 
coordinator emphasized at the final 
conference that the heterogeneous 
consortium had proved to be able to 
successfully connect different aspects 
of packaging and could function as 
a platform for further developments, 
there was no clear prospect of con-
tinuing institutional entrepreneurship 
when the project was finished.24 
4.4 Exploring future develop-
ments in the food packaging 
sector
The three waves of institutional entre-
preneurship show how dedicated ac-
tors emerged, responding to changing 
situations in the food packaging sec-
tor and beyond. However, they had no 
apparent lasting effects yet in terms 
of innovation.  By the end of 2008, 
relatively little was still happening 
regarding (known) product introduc-
tions engineered by nanotechnolo-
gies (Chaudhry et al. 2008).  On the 
other hand, there are indicators for 
the uptake of proposed generic rules 
and practices. By the end of 2008 the 
EU confederation of food and drink 
industries (CIAA) was considering to 
adopt a code of conduct inspired by 
the Responsible Nanocode.25 
What could be happening now? I sug-
gest that there might be a fourth wave 
of initiatives defining themselves as 
attempts to break through the impass-
es, which are widely recognized. The 
promotion of generic rules and prac-
24  Observations by the author during Sus-
tainpack’s final conference in May 2008.
25  Observations by the author during Nan-
otechnology & the law conference in Leu-
ven (2008).
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tices about responsible development 
of nanotechnologies further paved the 
way for new institutional entrepre-
neurship. To explore this suggestion I 
refer to the scenarios we constructed 
for a stakeholder workshop about na-
notechnology and food packaging. 
The three scenarios had different 
starting points for institutional entre-
preneurship: a group of technology 
developers revamping sustainabil-
ity promises of nanotechnology en-
gineered packaging materials; some 
pro-active regulators creating a finan-
cial safety net for liability claims; and 
a broad stakeholder platform explor-
ing technological options and stake-
holder requirements. Each scenario 
then explored actions and reactions, 
and shifts and changes over time. This 
is not the place to go into details. Suf-
fice to say that none of the scenarios 
had an across the board uptake and 
acceptance of nanotechnology engi-
neered products in food packaging as 
its outcome. Each initiative had limi-
tations (up to blind spots), which cre-
ated constraints on their uptake and 
the eventual outcome. They added a 
patch to the patchwork. The stake-
holder platform achieved the most, 
which indicates the importance of 
such broad spaces for interaction, but 
in the scenario it eventually collapsed 
because the broad variety of partici-
pants led to internal struggles. 
During the workshop, participants 
recognized the importance of co-ordi-
nation and the relevance of a broad 
stakeholder platform, and were inter-
ested in institutional entrepreneurship 
initiatives to create a breakthrough. 
Still, waiting games appeared to be 
on their minds. They were cautious 
about co-operation with other players 
and taking an initiative. Participants 
waited for their upstream or down-
stream partners to come up with con-
crete proposals (and materials). Their 
arguments referred to the importance 
of short term (3 years) return on in-
vestment, and pointed out uncertain-
ties about actual performance (added 
value) of new packaging materials 
and whether these would fit existing 
production equipment. Anticipation 
on societal embedding was consid-
ered important, so important that 
one of the participants was willing to 
stop a nanotechnology food packag-
ing product development trajectory, 
if there were concerns about lacking 
sustainability. 
While the fourth wave of institutional 
entrepreneurs, possibly leading to 
sector-level changes, might draw on 
actors embedded in the food packag-
ing sector, the latter appear to be con-
strained by the present structures and 
the attendant waiting games. Other 
actors, embedded in multiple sectors 
(like materials suppliers) and/or with 
an interest or stake in the embed-
ding of nanotechnologies (as in the 
alliances between nanotechnology 
promoters and government funding 
agencies), will be more prepared, and 
more able, to start entrepreneurship 
initiatives. Authorities can introduce 
new patterns, such as standards or 
testing procedures to test compliance 
with regulatory proposals. This fourth 
wave and activities of authorities 
would further reduce uncertainties on 
societal embedding of nanotechnolo-
gies in the food packaging sector.
5 Conclusions 
Through the lens of tracing institu-
tional entrepreneurs and their activi-
ties, I was able to show a pattern of 
development in the food packag-
ing sector where rules and practices 
emerged before the envisaged nano-
enabled technologies entered the 
market. Anticipation on eventual em-
bedding of these technologies drove 
the institutional entrepreneurs. Over 
time, further aspects of eventual em-
bedding became important, and other 
kinds of institutional entrepreneurs 
became involved, including NGOs and 
regulatory agencies introducing vol-
untary schemes. The net effect is the 
emergence of a patchwork of rules 
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and practices which extend further 
than industry structures as tradition-
ally conceived. It is this patchwork 
which will act as a ‘soft’ framing con-
dition for further developments in the 
uptake and embedding of nanotech-
nologies in the food packaging sector.
Considering how this patchwork 
emerged, there are, of course, factors 
and circumstances specific to the food 
packaging sector. But there are also 
general dynamics related to the un-
certainties inherent to emerging tech-
nologies. This is clear in the waves 
of institutional entrepreneurship that 
were found. In the beginning, around 
2000, the uncertainty about the even-
tual performance of nanotechnolo-
gies was addressed by actors promot-
ing the legitimacy of the combination 
of nanotechnologies and food pack-
aging technologies. This first ‘wave’ 
of dedicated initiatives was followed 
by a second wave in which other ac-
tors pushed for the incorporation of 
broader societal aspects and risks 
in embedding nanotechnologies in 
the packaging sector. Initial enthusi-
asm for nanotechnologies shifted to 
caution. Uncertainties related to risk 
assessment created a further wait-
ing game between firms and regula-
tory authorities, in a sector which 
was already prone to the emergence 
of waiting games. Then, institutional 
entrepreneurship initiatives emerged 
that tried to break through these wait-
ing games and overcome reluctance. 
Many of the initiatives, while focused 
on risk issues, maintained an appre-
ciation of the potential benefits of na-
notechnologies, but that did not lead 
to dedicated entrepreneurship pro-
moting nanotechnology engineered 
materials. This implies that the whole 
notion of ‘responsible development’ 
of nanotechnology became important 
and that it became illegitimate to go 
for just promotional institutional en-
trepreneurship. Still, it might be pos-
sible that such institutional entrepre-
neurship occurs. One of the scenarios 
speculating on a next wave of activi-
ties did include such type of activities, 
but ran aground on waiting games 
in the food packaging sector. A next 
wave will likely be initiated by actors 
with broader interests than just food 
packaging, such as material suppliers, 
or coalitions of actors across the inno-
vation and product value chain. 
Thus, the conclusion about how a 
patchwork of anticipation-oriented 
patterns is emerging at the sector-
level, before these technologies enter 
the market, extends beyond the food 
packaging sector. For all new and 
emerging technologies uncertainties 
have to be reduced to overcome wait-
ing games. Such reductions will start 
with the promises of emerging tech-
nologies, and then address possible 
concerns. Actually, waiting games are 
also a reduction of uncertainties, by 
doing nothing (which will not appeal 
to technology promoters). 
The nature of the reduction of uncer-
tainties between supply and demand, 
and with respect to regulation up to 
broader societal acceptance will de-
pend on the composition of the value 
chain and articulation of regulations 
(formal and informal) at the level of 
a sector. In the case of food packag-
ing, intersecting value chains intro-
duced specific complexities and un-
certainties (such as the world of food, 
sensitive to public acceptance). In 
other sectors, such as micro/nano-
electronics, public acceptance is not 
a prominent issue. For new nano-
enabled materials and surfaces, there 
appears to be broad public accept-
ance, but some consideration of risk, 
with reference to nano-particles. Par-
ticularly important, given the enabling 
character of nanotechnologies, is that 
intersecting value chains will occur 
more often, as with nano-engineered 
delivery systems for pharmaceuticals 
(drugs) and nutriceuticals (food). Pre-
liminary data of my ongoing research 
in the drug delivery sector show a first 
wave of institutional entrepreneur-
ship to promote and legitimize a link 
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between the promise and possible 
use, but no second wave (yet).
Thus, the basic dynamics involved in 
developing and introducing new and 
emerging technologies in sectors of 
industry are carried by attempts at 
reduction of uncertainties, embedded 
in, and contributing to, sector-level 
development. This insight is not only 
a contribution to our understanding 
of new and emerging technologies. 
It also adds to the analysis of indus-
trial change by including the dynam-
ics of emerging technologies and 
how these incite anticipatory action 
of institutional entrepreneurs which, 
in addition to their immediate effects 
on product development, introduce 
further legitimation requirements and 
broaden industry structures.
In general, analyses of industrial 
change processes need to take into 
account emerging anticipatory pat-
terns and distributed institutional en-
trepreneurship. Conversely, studies of 
institutional entrepreneurship need to 
take into account the distributed and 
embedded character of institutional 
entrepreneurship and emerging in-
dustry structures.
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Abstract
The underlying premise of this essay is the hypothesis that quality and signifi-
cance of scientific research in any given society could be used as mirrors reflect-
ing its true prosperity. By comparing the two cases of comparatively prosperous 
scientific management of South Korea and Slovenia, with the example of Serbia, 
illustrating the poor scientific and industrial productivity typically faced by the de-
veloping countries, a few general guidelines for the evolution of a society towards 
higher scientific and social prominence are outlined. It is argued that the most fa-
vourable pattern of growth should be based on the parallel progress in control of 
scientific policies on one side and the excellence of scientific and basic education 
on the other. The “leapfrog” tactics, according to which the less developed coun-
tries should learn from the natural cycle of alternate progressions and regres-
sions that the developed countries experience, is especially highlighted. Applied 
research is demonstrated to be most productive when it is carried out on top of 
already established and prolific infrastructural and industrial bases. Examples are 
given in favour of the fact that the technological design and industrial solutions 
shown as successful in the context of a developed society, often turn out to be 
impractical and inefficient when straightforwardly transformed to less developed 
social settings. As a result, the strategy of adjustment of production capacities 
to local needs is advised to be considered when implementing a new technol-
ogy on different social, political and economic grounds. Finally, it is concluded 
that to provide conditions for effective transfer and implementation of advanced 
know-how and novel technologies, embedment into international science and 
engineering networks is required as much as strong and sustainable local scien-
tific and technological bases. 
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“There is something within me that might 
be illusion as it is often case with young de-
lighted people, but if I would be fortunate to 
achieve some of my ideals, it would be on 
the behalf of the whole of humanity. If those 
hopes would become fulfilled, the most ex-
citing thought would be that it is a deed of a 
Serb.” (Nikola Tesla, Address at the Belgra-
de Train Station, June 1, 1892)
1 Introduction
Innumerable studies have been con-
ducted in support of the view that 
quality and significance of scientific 
research in any given society could be 
seen as mirrors of its long-term pros-
perity. Scientific excellence looped 
with high levels of industrial produc-
tivity and openness to innovation has 
been considered as grounds for thriv-
ing global economies (Inter Acad-
emy Council 2004). An OECD report 
has concluded that “links to science 
are more important than in the past” 
and called for an inevitable “intensi-
fication of industry–science relation-
ships in the knowledge economy” 
(OECD 2002). Fig. 1 nicely illustrates 
that knowledge- and technology-in-
tensive economies create well paid 
jobs, contribute to the local economy 
with a high-value output, and ensure 
economic competitiveness, which 
shows that knowledge-intensive in-
dustries have grown exponentially in 
the past decade and more rapidly than 
other segments of economic activity. 
A continual rise in the science and 
engineering occupation share of to-
tal civilian employment has thus been 
evident in the US and other developed 
countries of the world (NSB 2004).
On the other hand, we seem to live in 
a world in which inequalities and ill 
distribution of wealth present some 
of the crucial social factors of its in-
stability and non-sustainability. To il-
lustrate this, Fig. 2 demonstrates the 
disparity between rich and poor coun-
tries of the world by the champagne-
glass shaped distribution of the global 
income, showing that the poorest 20 
% of the human population hold less 
than 1 % of the global wealth, where-
as the richest 20 % are associated 
with more than 85 % of the world GDP 
(UNDP 1999, Watkins 2006). The aim 
of this report is to provide a perspec-
tive on some of the essential relation-
ships that could be used in directing 
the planetary growth towards ame-
lioration of the problem of inequality 
and finding the ways to fruitfully in-
corporate the cutting-edge scientific 
practice into less developed regions 
and countries of the world.
The implicit assumption that the fol-
lowing discourse will be based on is 
that science, seen as fundamentally 
underlying the prosperity of a society, 
can be used as the most direct tool in 
levelling the disparity in development 
between wealthy and poor countries 
of the world. Two cases of compara-
tively prosperous management of sci-
ence and technologies (S&T), that is, 
of South Korea and Slovenia, are thus 
presented with the aim of finding the 
principles that would help to outline 
the convenient policies and progres-
sive directions for the developing 
countries, the example of which is in 
this work taken to be Serbia.
Figure 1: Global value added of 
knowledge- and technology-in-
tensive industries for the time pe-
riod of 1995–2007. Source: NSB 
2010.
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The United States was followed by the EU with $2.9 trillion. 
World shares in these industries fluctuated for the United 
States and the EU, but by 2007 had settled near their 1995 
levels. Increased production by China and the Asia-9 ex-
panded their value-added output of commercial KI services, 
but at about half a trillion dollars each, their world market 
shares remained just below 5%. Flat output growth in Japan 
caused its market share to decline by more than half, to 8%. 
The same pattern is evident in the individual KI service 
sectors: fluctuations in the U.S. and EU shares, steep de-
clines for Japan’s shares, and modest to rapid growth from 
low bases for China and the Asia-9, leading to modest in-
creases in their world shares.
Relative to these KI trends, high-technology manufactur-
ing shows a much stronger world position for the develop-
ing Asian economies and much steeper decline for Japan. 
The Asia-9 output was about 10% of the value-added world 
total over the 1995–2007 period, while China’s share in-
creased from 3% to 14%. Japan’s share dropped from 27% 
to 11%. The U.S. and EU shares both showed modest up-
ward movement.
The five HT industries are, in decreasing order of the $1.2 
trillion 2007 global value-added total: communications and 
semiconductors ($445 billion), pharmaceuticals ($319 bil-
lion), scientific instruments ($189 billion), aerospace ($153 
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Methods
In this work we provide a few system-
ic guidelines for the design of science 
policies for underdeveloped countries, 
while referring to some of the basic 
criteria for the evaluation of progress 
in all scientific disciplines. The chosen 
parameters for this assessment partly 
belong to the S&T Indicators for Eu-
ropean Research Area (STI-ERA) and 
have been regularly used for this pur-
pose (European Commission 2007; 
Turlea et al. 2010). Serbia is going to 
form the central element in the dis-
course at hand. South Korea and Slo-
venia were chosen to provide a con-
structive contrasting comparison with 
the case of Serbia on the one hand, 
because Eurostat has provided annual 
statistic comparisons with South Ko-
rea, and on the other hand because of 
the increasing social prosperity that 
has been connected to appropriate 
S&T policies. As countries that ena-
bled this path, after eras of economic 
and public safety turmoil, they may 
demonstrate how to substitute the 
downward path of warfare, poverty 
and international isolation with that 
of scientific prominence, economic 
prosperity and worldwide recogni-
tion. What makes Slovenia and Serbia 
comparable is the fact that they once 
shared a common political system 
within the former Yugoslav constitu-
tion. The funding and management in 
their R&D sectors once conformed to 
the same practices, and after the dis-
solution of the former Yugoslavia they 
also inherited the same educational 
traditions.
This paper also presents an analysis 
of various statistical and bibliomet-
ric indicators of progress in research. 
Such analyses have been a widely ac-
cepted tool for assessing the quality 
of the scientific output of countries or 
institutions (Alik 2008, Gupta/Dha-
wan 2009, Csajbók et al. 2007). Sev-
eral such analyses were carried out 
with the aim of assessing the scien-
tific productivity of Serbia and other 
former Yugoslav countries (Jovanovic´ 
et al. 2010, Lewison/Igic 1999, Igic´ 
2002, Bencetic´  Klaic´ /Klaic´  2004, Sam-
bunjak et al. 2008, Lukenda 2006, An-
dreis/Jokic´  2008). Details regarding the 
bibliometric analysis method that we 
have used are given in the Appendix. 
Figure 2:  The disparity between rich and poor countries of the world 
demonstrated by the champagne glass shaped world income distri-
bution in percentiles of the population (left), and shares in the world 
wealth held by populations from different regions of the world (right). 
Source: Watkins 2006
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the richest and in the poorest countries is wide 
and getting wider. In 1990 the average Ameri-
can was 38 times richer than the average Tan-
zanian. Today the average American is 61 times 
richer. Purchasing power parity income in low-
income countries as a group is one-thirteenth 
that in high-income countries.
Weighting for population changes the pic-
ture. Because incomes have been growing more 
rapidly in China and (less spectacularly) in 
India than in high-income countries over the 
past two decades, the average gap has been clos-
ing in relative terms. This reverses a trend to-
wards increased global inequality that started 
in the 1820s and continued until 1992.47 Even 
here, though, the idea of convergence has to be 
put in context. High growth in India has been 
one of the most powerful forces for convergence. 
But on 2000–05 growth trends it will still take 
India until 2106 to catch up with high-income 
countries. For other countries and regions con-
vergence prospects are even more limited. Were 
high-income countries to stop growing today 
and Latin America and Sub-Saharan Africa to 
continue on their current growth trajectories, it 
would take Latin America until 2177 and Af-
rica until 2236 to catch up.
Most developing regions are falling behind, 
not catching up with, rich countries. More-
over, convergence is a relative concept. Abso-
lute income inequalities between rich and poor 
countries are increasing even when developing 
countries have higher growth rates—precisely 
because the initial income gaps are so large (fig-
ure 1.15). If average incomes grow by 3% in Sub-
Saharan Africa and in high-income Europe, for 
example, the absolute change will be an extra 
$51 per person in Africa and an extra $854 per 
person in Europe. 
Part of the problem with the debate over 
global inequality is that it misses an impor-
tant point. Income inequality is exceptionally 
high however it is measured and regardless of 
whether it is rising or falling. On the (conser-
vative) assumption that the world’s 500 richest 
people listed by Forbes magazine have an in-
come equivalent to no more than 5% of their 
assets, their income exceeds that of the poorest 
416 million people.48 
The scale of global inequality is best cap-
tured by global income distribution models. 
These models use national household survey 
data to create a unified global income distribu-
tion, placing everybody in the world in a uni-
fied ranking regardless of where they live (box 
1.5). Presented in graphic form, global income 
distribution resembles a champagne glass, with 
a large concentration of income at the top and 
a thin stem at the bottom (figure 1.16).49 The 
gap between top and bottom is very large—far 
greater than that found in even the most un-
equal countries. In Brazil the ratio of the income 
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2 The case of South Korea
Many developing countries are nowa-
days facing similar challenges as the 
ones faced by South Korea prior to 
setting forth an aim to transform its 
society from the war stricken society 
of the 1950s, to the one marked with 
scientific and technological promi-
nence of today (Oh 2007). South Ko-
reans have demonstrated that with 
appropriate social and scientific poli-
cies, an extraordinarily high rate of 
development could be attained. As 
such, South Korea sets an example for 
numerous countries in the embryonic 
stages of scientific development.
2.1 Investments in R&D 
The South Korean science policy has 
been typified by exceptionally high 
investments in R&D. By investing 3.5 
% of its GDP to research, South Korea 
is a world leader in the governmen-
tal support of R&D (DESTATIS 2009) 
(Fig. 3). Although South Korea was 
considered a poor country in the early 
1960s, it increased the per-capita GDP 
by 7 % by 1990, mostly owing to an 
export-oriented economic strategy 
and investments in innovative indus-
trial production (Rodrik 1995). In the 
early 1990s, connections between 
academia and private industries were 
established, endowing the universi-
ties with a more entrepreneurial role 
and transforming them from primarily 
teaching-oriented to research-orient-
ed centres, which resulted in the rise 
in research productivity (Eom/Lee 
2010).
Patenting of scientific inventions has 
been equally encouraged, and South 
Korea currently ranks first on the list 
of the number of patents per GDP 
worldwide (Mahlich 2007). The 1997 
crisis was blamed on the dependence 
of the South Korean economy on 
only a few key industries, and since 
then the industrial diversification and 
the development of a broad range of 
high-tech projects and activities has 
been incentivized by the government 
(Tearse 2008). Also, in 1967, a special 
governmental agency was created 
with to attract outstanding South Ko-
rean scientists from abroad. Excellent 
job opportunities for college gradu-
ates were provided too, so that nowa-
days more than 80 % of high-school 
graduates decide to enrol in one of the 
colleges (Hyeon 2007). 
2.2 Adverse effects
However, each pattern of growth in 
its wake inevitably produces a set of 
adverse effects, which, on the other 
hand, provide opportunities for fur-
ther research and growth (Uskokovic´ 
2009b). In view of that, a few detri-
mental consequences of the progres-
sive path of the South Korean scien-
tific society should be mentioned as 
well. One of them is the strong pres-
sure for scientists to publish in order 
to maintain and strengthen their fac-
ulty positions. The number of publi-
cations is, thus, frequently regarded 
as more important than their qual-
ity, which spurs scientists to publish 
their works prematurely and in less 
prominent journals, resulting in low 
citation frequency of South Korean 
researchers when normalized to the 
total number of publications in com-
parison with other scientific powers of 
the world. 
Another side effect of the South Ko-
rean S&T policy has been placing too 
much emphasis on applied research 
and too little on the fundamental. In 
fact, only 10 % of all grant applica-
tions in basic sciences are approved 
with the overall spending also at ~10 
% of the total R&D budget. This is in 
spite of the fact that as of 2009, 3.5 
% of the state budget is allocated to 
research, and by 2012 South Korea 
plans on reaching 5 % and becoming 
the world’s leading country in terms 
of the amount funding normalized 
to GDP (Tong-Hyung 2009). Further-
more, with the government share in 
research investments of 25 %, the por-
tion of basic science projects funded 
from the budget is only 2.5 % of the 
total. Communication between de-
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partments within any given research 
institution is said to be low, and they 
mostly function in isolation from each 
other, which presents an obstacle for 
multidisciplinary research. Compe-
tition for funds has, just as in many 
other academic institutions in the de-
veloped world, left scientists without 
a broad technical and administrative 
support (Oh 2007). Promotion and 
compensation mechanisms at South 
Korean universities are still largely 
based on the number of years spent 
in service, although some institutions 
have adopted salary schemes based 
on the number of published papers 
Figure 3: Total R&D investments for different countries expressed in 
GDP percentages. Sources are given in Table 4.
0,00 0,50 1,00 1,50 2,00 2,50 3,00 3,50 4,00
Cyprus
Slovakia
Bulgaria
Serbia without Kosovo UNMIK
Romania
Poland
Greece
Malta
Latvia
Turkey
Croatia
Lithuania
Hungary
Estonia
Russian Federation
Italy
Portugal
Spain
Ireland
China (excluding Hong Kong)
Slovenia
Czech Republic
Luxembourg
Norway
Netherlands
United Kingdom
European Union (27 countries)
Euro area (16 countries)
Belgium
European Union (15 countries)
France
Germany
Austria
Denmark
United States
Iceland
South Korea
Japan
Finland
Sweden
38   STI Studies 2010: 33-62
and their impact on the national econ-
omy (Nature Materials 2007a). Finally, 
only 10 % of the South Korean faculty 
members and less than 15 % of all 
the researchers are women (Fig. 11), 
which indicates that the intellectual 
potential of the country has not been 
exerted to its full capacity. The results 
of a SWOT analysis of the South Ko-
rean R&D sector are presented in Ta-
ble 1.
3 The case of Slovenia
Slovenia is regarded as a country with 
one of the most impressive combina-
tions of GDP, life standard, economic 
prosperity and scientific productivity 
among the members of the EU that 
joined the latter in 2004. Its current 
growth rate with respect to techno-
logical performance is above the EU 
average, and it is the only accession 
country that spent more than 1.5 % 
of its GDP on research and develop-
ment in early 2000s, and the only one 
that produced more than 415 publica-
tions per million inhabitants (Nature 
Materials 2004). Despite the fact that 
shrinkage of the local market that fol-
lowed the collapse of the Yugoslav 
constitution forced many industries 
to undergo restructuring, downsizing 
or even bankruptcy, with proper revi-
talization incentives from the govern-
ment level and an openness of aca-
demic research to cooperation with 
industry, an ascending trend in S&T 
performance has been made possible.
3.1  Strategies of growth
Promotion of academic research part-
nerships with various national and 
international industries has been seen 
in Slovenia as the most important in-
centive for scientific productivity and 
Table 1: SWOT analysis of the South Korean R&D sector. 
Strengths Weaknesses Opportunities Threats
One of the highest 
rates of state invest-
ments in science 
and engineering in 
the world
Lack of openness 
to integrate foreign 
researchers in lo-
cal academia and 
industry
Pushing the in-
dustry-academia 
partnerships, which 
are already one the 
leading in the world, 
to a new level
Too little of empha-
sis placed on fun-
damental research 
versus the applied 
one
Excellent level of 
industry-academia 
partnership
Low level of inter-
departmental com-
munication and 
interdisciplinary 
collaborations
Benefiting from 
promotion of cross-
disciplinary research
A period of stagna-
tion may follow 
the actual period of 
intensive growth, as 
they have alternated 
in the past
Well-developed in-
dustry-based re-
search with a large 
share of the global 
market
Low technical and 
administrative sup-
port
Bringing in foreign 
talented students 
and postdocs and 
integrating them in 
the Korean science 
system
“Publish or per-
ish” pressure may 
lead to publication 
quantity being given 
greater importance 
over their quality
Being one of the 
most techno-
logically advanced 
countries, a leader 
in electronic com-
munications
Low percentage of 
female scientists
Introducing a salary 
scheme based not 
only on the number 
of published papers, 
but on their impact 
on the national 
economy too
Uncompetitive 
promotion and 
compensation 
mechanisms may 
lower scientific pro-
ductivity
High levels of inter-
national research 
cooperation activity, 
including both aca-
demic and private 
scientific centers
Low citation fre-
quency of publica-
tions originating in 
Korean scientific 
institutions
Introducing innova-
tive programs to 
attract students to 
science careers, 
such as Brain Korea 
21
Weak technical and 
administrative sup-
port may hinder the 
research efficiency
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technological success (Kornhauser 
2000). For example, a single depart-
ment within Jožef Stefan Institute, De-
partment of Advanced Materials, with 
less than 20 employees, has main-
tained a persistent cooperation with 
a dozen of national and international 
industries in the past decade.
Among business corporations, smart 
innovation policies resulted in the 
public company, Gorenje, becom-
ing one of the eight largest European 
manufacturers of white goods with a 
4% share of the European market in 
2006. In 2004, as part of the efforts 
to extend its links to R&D domain, it 
contributed as one of the industrial 
cofounders of the Jožef Stefan Inter-
national Postgraduate School.
As early as 1985, Slovenia launched 
the 2000 Young Researchers pro-
gramme with the aim to promote 
graduate studies in science and en-
gineering and form a strong research 
basis that would satisfy both academ-
ic and industrial needs. To improve 
the ratio of industrial versus academic 
doctoral degrees (only 20 % in 1995), 
in 1995 the Ministry of S&T decided 
to subsidize the salaries for the first 
three years of newly employed scien-
tists with master and doctoral degrees 
in industrial research departments.
Other legislative incentives were 
brought forth with the purpose of sup-
porting business enterprises in tech-
nological development and strength-
ening their R&D potentials. Knowing 
that public knowledge institutions are 
usually not the main source of inno-
vation, the Centres of Excellence were 
established at the major academic re-
search institutions with the aim to in-
tegrate basic research with the stages 
of prototyping, testing and production 
in selected cooperating companies. 
Table 2: SWOT analysis of the Slovenian RTDI system.
Strengths Weaknesses Opportunities Threats
Well-developed and 
financially stable 
educational system
Low mobility from 
academic to indus-
trial research sector
Increased public 
and private invest-
ments in RTDI
Failing to increase 
public and private 
investments in RTDI
Large interest in 
higher education 
studies
Low citation index 
and patenting per-
formance
Raising research 
excellence through 
competition and 
strengthening of 
academic-business 
links
In the implementa-
tion of S&T policies, 
individual interests 
could prevail over 
national ones
EU average in the 
number of research-
ers per capita, and 
no significant “brain 
drain”
Scientific excel-
lence limited to 
few disciplines and 
mono-disciplinary 
approaches
Enhanced inter-
nationalization of 
higher education, 
science, technology 
and innovation
Initiating “brain 
drain” by an open-
ness to the interna-
tional community
Well-developed 
research and com-
munication infra-
structure
Low level of re-
search and innova-
tion management 
skills
Fiscal policy mea-
sures
Failing to establish 
a policy making 
process that would 
flexibly follow the 
research innovations
High levels of in-
novational capacity 
in some industrial 
sectors, e.g. tele-
communications, 
electronics, phar-
maceuticals
Underdeveloped ven-
ture capital  market 
and low market 
share of high-tech 
products
Establishment 
of intermediary 
knowledge-transfer 
institutions and net-
working (e.g. tech-
nology platforms)
Employees inflexible 
to the trans-disci-
plinary demands of 
globalization
Well-developed in-
ternational scientific 
relationships
Insufficient funding 
of industrial R&D
Increased concen-
tration of public 
funds in priority 
S&T areas
Prioritization of large 
integrated projects  
within Framework  
Programs
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3.2 Pitfalls
However, despite the traditionally de-
veloped international and regional sci-
entific cooperation and relationships, 
Slovenia comprises a comparatively 
small gross scientific network. Even 
though, as of 2008, it was involved in 
850 bilateral scientific projects with 
countries from all continents of the 
world with the exception of Australia, 
the small number of Slovenian project 
coordinators is often quoted as a sign 
of incapacity to support the develop-
ment of this solid networked basis for 
cooperation.
The questions on future prospects of 
the impressive economic growth of 
Slovenia – so far still provided more 
by large infrastructural investments, 
and less by the targeted development 
of “knowledge-based” products – are 
also often posed in view of more open 
scientific, social and immigration poli-
cies adopted by the majority of other 
EU countries.
Small market size naturally limits the 
efficiency of translation of research 
findings into the commercial domain. 
As much as the small size of Slove-
nian R&D sector could lead to smooth 
collaboration among scientists and 
engineers, its detrimental potentials 
may become obvious in the evalu-
ation of research proposals, during 
which grant approvals could become 
based on social and scientific promi-
nence rather than on true scientific 
excellence. It is only during the past 
three years that the practice of an in-
ternational review of scientific pro-
ject proposals has been noticed. By 
promoting conditions for an unbi-
ased competition for research funds, 
a more efficient expenditure of public 
funds could be expected. The results 
of a SWOT analysis of the Slovenian 
Research, Technological Develop-
ment and Innovation (RTDI) system 
(Komac 2005), are presented in Table 
2. 
4 The case of Serbia
In comparison with the example of 
South Korea, a country that has raised 
its economic and scientific perfor-
mance and prestige in the past few 
decades, Serbia illustrates a country 
that lived through the opposite path 
(Benson 2004).
Neutral with respect to the Cold War, 
Yugoslavia was considered one of the 
freest countries of the world, acting 
as an excellent bridge for scientific 
communication between the East and 
the West prior to the fall of the Iron 
Curtain. For example, in the period 
between 1969 and 1989, Yugosla-
via was the permanent host country 
of the World Conference on Sinter-
ing (Kuczynski et al. 1987, Palmour 
et al. 1990). As a founder of the larg-
est union of third-world countries, it 
also provided possibilities for their 
successful integration into hopes and 
promises of the developed world.
Breaking away from the Stalinist cen-
tral planning system immediately 
after the end of World War II, Yugo-
slavs designed a more humane sys-
tem which provided conditions for an 
open participation of the workers in 
conducting the management of their 
companies (Estrin 1993; Lynn et al. 
2002), and the UN Economic Com-
mission found in the early 1960s that 
Yugoslavia had the highest rate of ex-
pansion in Europe (Schultze 1962). 
The first large-scale foreign invest-
ments in Eastern European countries 
were found in Yugoslavia: Murata/EI 
Niš, Philips/EI Niš, and Sandvik/Prvi 
Partizan were some of the research-
intensive industrial partnerships.
However, the breakup that began in 
1991, slumped the Serbian life stand-
ard. In less than a few years, Serbia 
shifted from a relatively prosperous 
path to a scenario facing international 
sanctions and isolation, the relocation 
of resources to fund the war, and 1027 
an overall hyperinflation impact rate 
between 1990–1994.
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4.1 The education system 
One of the positive aspects of the Ser-
bian science, preserved even during 
the harshest times, has been the rig-
orous and comprehensive education 
system. However, an overly ample 
education takes its toll as well. For 
example, the annual transience rate 
at the Faculty of Physical Chemistry, 
one of the most prestigious colleges 
at Belgrade University, has been as 
low as 10 %, whereas the average du-
ration of studies is at 8 years almost 
twice longer than the anticipated 4.5 
years.
The perception that science careers 
are reserved only for superbly talent-
ed ones is thus widely present in the 
society, which detracts many young 
scholars from careers in research 
and science colleges in general. Con-
sequently, with ~10,000 researchers 
(0.13 % of the overall population), Ser-
bia has ~10 times lesser population 
of researchers per capita compared 
to the EU average (Yucht 2005), and 
is rated low on the scales of scien-
tific talent and creativity indices. The 
educational system is also blamed for 
its lack of flexibility, as most colleges 
pursue only general study programs, 
without offering options to begin with 
professional specialization at an ear-
ly undergraduate stage. In Slovenia, 
in contrast, all science students are 
obliged to spend at least six months 
at one of the external research institu-
tions prior to graduation.
The recent adoption of the study 
management in accordance with the 
Bologna declaration is expected to 
increase flexibility and diversity of 
the teaching system. However, de-
spite having been enacted in 2003, 
the Bologna declaration targets the 
transience rate of 80 %, and yet at the 
University of Belgrade as a whole, it is 
currently as low as 16 %. In general, 
only 25 % of high-school graduates 
enrol in one of the colleges in Serbia, 
whereby 70 % of the admitted subse-
quently drop out.
4.2 Missing links
Another major demerit of the college 
education is that it occurs in isolation 
from the S&T needs of the society. Pre-
vious studies have shown that efforts 
from the higher education sector need 
to be explicitly linked to the rate of in-
novations and fields of expertise on 
which this innovation depends in or-
der to positively influence the growth 
in labour productivity (Aghion/Howitt 
1998). Still, many people oppose an 
education system that would be less 
comprehensive and more optimized 
for the demands of the society, refer-
ring to certain fields, such as informa-
tion technologies (IT), in which a drop 
in the quality of knowledge that stu-
dents gained was observed following a 
high demand for IT engineers.
The lack of coordination between the 
study programmes and the actual la-
bour market as a result leaves 95 % 
of fresh graduates unable to find a job 
without an additional training. Fur-
thermore, there is a consequent dis-
parity between close to a million of 
unemployed adults and about 50,000 
permanently open positions due to the 
lack of appropriate qualifications and 
skills (Šekeljic´  2007). 
Instead of engaging students in pro-
jects of real-life importance for their 
social environment, their professional 
training typically deals with compre-
hensive theoretical calculations and 
laboratory exercises which are rarely 
tied to outcomes of an immediate 
R&D significance. Freshly graduated 
students thus have little awareness 
of how their knowledge could be im-
plemented in the “real world”, and the 
most talented graduates decide to pur-
sue their subsequent studies abroad. 
90 % of the graduates of the Faculty 
of Electrical Engineering in Belgrade 
from 1992 to 2000 thus continued their 
careers abroad, whereas the general 
trend estimated among natural sci-
ence students at Belgrade University is 
slightly less drastic: 33 % find positions 
in foreign countries after the gradua-
tion.
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4.3 Brain drain – brain gain
The number of Serbian emigrants in 
the world is estimated to be more than 
3.5 million, which is a number that is 
equal to 50 % of the current popula-
tion of Serbia (MDRS 2010, SORS 
2010). A large portion of these emi-
grants are highly educated individuals 
that left the country during the harsh 
economic era of the past two decades 
(UNDESAPD 2005). In comparison, 
the majority of Slovenian doctoral sci-
entists leave only for short-term post-
doctoral stays in foreign laboratories. 
The positive side of the “brain drain”, 
however, is that it could provide a cru-
cial impulse in the networking of local 
R&D infrastructure with international 
institutions and associations. As such, 
it has a potential to be renamed into 
“brain gain” under certain conditions.
In 2010, the Serbian Ministry of Sci-
ence has begun the process of col-
lecting information about Serbian sci-
entists based in foreign labs with the 
aim to promote their collaboration 
with the domestic R&D sectors. Ac-
cording to the report given by the Ser-
bian Ministry of S&T, an international 
refereeing system will be established 
using the capacity of the Serbian sci-
ence community in exile and possi-
bilities will be opened up for Serbian 
researchers living abroad to be part of 
national projects (MSTDRS 2009).
Fostering a more official recognition 
and integration of small foreign-based 
islands of experts into science policy 
making through common research 
projects, transfers of technologies or 
expert consultations is thought to be 
an excellent step forward. The con-
temporary electronic communication 
systems can significantly facilitate the 
process of seeking partnerships as 
the society strives to unfold the posi-
tive potentials of the “brain drain”. 
The results of a SWOT analysis of the 
Serbian R&D sector are presented in 
Table 3.
4.4 Breaking walls
The Yugoslav Materials Research So-
ciety has through its annually held 
YUCOMAT conferences proven that 
the intellectual Diaspora can attract 
renowned scientists from abroad and 
provide a local forum for exchange 
of ideas and formation of collabora-
tive networks (Uskokovic´  D. 2007). 
Such meetings have also provided an 
excellent opportunity to initiate col-
laborations with scientists from the 
neighbouring states, many of which 
belonged to the former Yugoslav con-
stitution.
Somewhat similar to Serbia, South 
Korea has struggled with a tenuous 
past in relations with its neighbours. 
In its case, it has been shown that sci-
entific connections established by uni-
versities and industries, owing to the 
traditionally more open-minded and 
cosmopolitan nature of intellectuals, 
could present the first steps in break-
ing the walls of mistrust held in place 
in people’s minds by remembering 
the historic events (Park/Leydesdorff 
2010).
Unlike the relations between North 
and South Korea, which have excep-
tionally slowly improved and are still 
filled with tensions (Cumings 1998), 
Serbia revitalized its economic and 
political relations with all the former 
Yugoslav republics, now independent 
states, promptly after the 1990s war-
time period. The number of coopera-
tion projects between the successor 
states of the former Yugoslavia has 
been increasing ever since (Jovanovic´ 
et al. 2010). With 100 such collabora-
tions in 2007, Serbia has doubled their 
number compared to the pre-civil War 
state of affairs (55 in 1990 and 50 in 
1991). However, with 1.75:1 as the cal-
culated ratio of the dominance factors 
between Slovenia/Croatia and Serbia, 
as of 2007, Slovenia and Croatia tend 
to be the dominant partners in these 
cooperative projects (Jovanovic´  et al. 
2010).
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Table 3: SWOT analysis of the Serbian R&D sector.
Strengths Weaknesses Opportunities Threats
Broad research ex-
perience
Lacking well struc-
tured strategy and 
vision of scientific 
development
Using worldwide con-
nections provided by 
Diaspora to form inter-
national collaborations
Failing to increase the 
already low public and 
private investments in 
R&D sector
Long tradition of 
high-quality basic 
education
Insufficient mod-
ernization of the 
research equip-
ment within scien-
tific centers
Taking full advantage of 
modern communication 
networks and infrastruc-
ture
Monopolization of 
private sector and the 
threat that short-term 
individual interests 
may prevail over the 
long-term national 
ones
Comparatively high 
number of publica-
tions in journals with 
high reputation
Investments in 
research from the 
budget stagnating 
despite the 6-fold 
increase in GDP 
in the same time 
period
Formation of collabora-
tive multi-disciplinary 
networks around centers 
of excellence
Initiating even more 
of the “brain drain” by 
the increased open-
ness to the interna-
tional community
High research ef-
ficiency reflected in 
comparatively low 
cost per publication
Discrepancy in re-
search excellence 
between academic 
and industrial sec-
tors
Appropriate fiscal 
policy measures that 
would promote partner-
ships with companies, 
academic spin-off and 
startup projects
Failing to define a 
clear vision of scientif-
ic progress and enable 
sustained funding for 
R&D sector
High rate of econom-
ic recovery, resulting 
in more than 6-fold 
increase in GDP in 
the 2000-2008 period
Low interest in 
higher education 
studies and signifi-
cant level of “brain 
drain”
Broad demand for 
marketable research 
products, such as in bio-
technology, agriculture, 
medicine, energy sectors 
and ecology
Fragmentation of re-
search due to lack of 
collaboration interests 
and/or communica-
tion skills
Respected and well 
established scientific 
Diaspora
Weak academic-
business links and 
underdeveloped 
venture capital 
market
Provision of outsourcing 
services
Possibility that a rise 
in political national-
ism may destabilize 
the trend of economic 
recovery
Well balanced 
gender population 
among researchers
Low levels of inno-
vational capacity 
in most industrial 
sectors and a lack 
of impetus for their 
investing in re-
search
Creation of the National 
Innovation System with 
looped Governance, 
Human resources, 
Science base, Business 
R&D and innovation, 
and Economic and mar-
ket development
Failure to focus on a 
few national priorities 
that would bring ma-
jor economic benefits
Joint work be-
tween the Ministry 
of Education and 
Ministry of S&T 
Development on 
optimizing R&D 
system
Little developed 
mechanisms to 
attract and support 
talented young 
researchers as 
well as promote 
social affirmation 
of scientists and 
innovators
Possibility of success-
ful participation in the 
Lisbon agenda and 
alignment with EU re-
search priorities
Continued superficial 
evaluation of scientific 
performance at the 
academic level
Links with institu-
tions leading FP7 
projects with par-
ticipating Serbian 
scientists
Low critical mass 
of researchers 
within scien-
tific centers (only 
4 institutions with 
more than 100 
researchers)
Approved project of 
development of centers 
of excellence, academic 
research centers and IT 
infrastructure
Continued social mar-
ginalization of promi-
nent scientists inter-
nationally established 
in their fields
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4.5 Increasing output
Although without any official nano-
technology initiative, around 700 
research papers arising from Ser-
bian scientific centres and relating to 
the field of nanoscience have been 
published in the 1996-2009 period 
(Ševkušic´ /Uskokovic´  2009). These pa-
pers were cited 5.1 times on average 
and their Hirsch index is equal to 26. 
They contribute to 5-6 % of the scien-
tific works published and originating 
from Serbian scientific institutions, 
which is comparable with many de-
veloped countries of the world.
There is also an increasing trend in 
the annual output of such publica-
tions. Hence, from 1998 to 2002, 
around 20 nano-prefixed papers af-
filiated with Serbian institutions were 
published annually, after which an ex-
ponential growth took over, resulting 
in 65 papers in 2005 and 154 in 2007 
(Ševkušic´ /Uskokovic´  2009). Materials 
Science Forum, the series that pub-
lished the highest quality works pre-
sented at the YUCOMAT conferences 
from 1996 to 2006, is by far leading in 
the number of the papers published: 
13 % of them. This signifies a major 
role that an international meeting 
such as YUCOMAT may play in pro-
moting dissemination of locally con-
ducted research in compliance with 
the highest quality standards.
4.6 Missing infrastructure
Only a spinning windmill can mill the 
wheat, and any grains thrown into a 
still mill are predestined to go rotten. 
The same happens to human knowl-
edge in the deficiency of an intellectu-
al infrastructure within the society. In 
a country like Serbia, the major prob-
lem behind the scientific inefficiency 
in both research and application do-
mains is associated with an inability 
of scientific research to find a fertile 
ground at the local level.
That Serbia is far from being a knowl-
edge-based economy is supported by 
the fact that the professionally crea-
tive part of the overall population (2.6 
%) accounted for creating only 1.1 % 
of the country’s GDP in 2005 (Kom-
nenic´ /Mikic´  2008). This explains why 
the current R&D investments relative 
to GDP are at 0.5 % extremely low 
in comparison with other European 
countries and with the range of 2–3.5 
% existing in the developed countries 
on average (cf. Fig. 3 on page 37 & Ta-
ble 4, column 4).
As high-quality research stands at 
the basis of competitive and innova-
tive industrial sectors, the vice versa 
argument applies too, that is, low in-
vestments in research can be used to 
explain the undersized and interna-
tionally uncompetitive economy. The 
recent program of S&T development 
in Serbia designed by the Ministry of 
S&T has thus concluded that
“Serbian science, despite improvements in 
the past few years, is still on an unsustaina-
ble path; investing in S&T is, for Serbia, the 
only way to create a sustainable economy 
and society” (MSTDRS 2009).
As shown in Fig. 3, the results from 
2007 suggest that Serbia is still at the 
very bottom in terms of R&D invest-
ments with respect to GDP.
Fig. 4 shows that although govern-
ment expenditures on S&T have been 
increasing in the past decade in abso-
lute numbers (Fig. 4a), they have been 
stagnating in terms of their relative 
amount with respect to the GDP (Fig. 
4b). In terms of absolute funding, in 
2008 the best subsidised research field 
in Serbia was chemistry with €7.5 mil-
lion, which is a minor amount in com-
parison with the average US National 
Institutes of Health monetary grant 
size of $400,000, and the total budget 
of the NIH that stands close to $30 bil-
lion (Giles/Wadman 2006).
4.7 Underdeveloped academia-
industry links
Low investments have naturally cor-
responded to negligible levels of sci-
entific productivity on average. Ac-
cording to our bibliometric analysis, 
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Table 4: Scientific and technological R&D parameters for different Euro-
pean counties, European Union, US, China, Japan and South Korea as of 
2007
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in a five-year period, 2000–2004, only 
25 % of scientists funded by the Minis-
try of Science had at least one article 
published in one of the ISI Journals. 
Furthermore, the average research 
costs per article were at €33,000 by an 
order of magnitude lower in compari-
son with the averages for the second-
wave members of the EU.
Although Figs. 5–6 demonstrate that 
scientific output stands in direct pro-
portion with the amount of invest-
ments, it is uncertain whether simple 
increases in investments in science 
without a well-coordinated action of 
other governmental, fiscal and indus-
trial sectors, and the long-term pros-
pect of the local economy, present an 
optimal solution. A classical analysis 
of national systems of technical in-
novation has shown that factors in-
volved in shaping an effective innova-
tive performance include high-quality 
education and training on one side, 
and stable and facilitative economic 
and trade policies on the other (Nel-
son 1993).
Therefore, any progressive social pol-
icies would need to place more em-
phasis on the significance of science 
in Serbia, since scientific productiv-
ity presents a strong indicator of the 
Figure 4: Government expendi-
tures on S&T in Serbia in the pe-
riod of 2001–2008 (a), and budg-
etary R&D expenditures in terms 
of percent of GDP for the same 
period (b). 
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Figure 5: Number of ISI publications per million residents as a function 
of research funds from the budget in EUR per capita for most European 
countries, including China and the US. 
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overall social welfare. An awareness 
that parallel investments in basic re-
search and in the improvements of 
the existing infrastructure and tech-
nological bases of the society are 
needed has been spurred and along 
with the projected growth in the fund-
ing of research, €400 million are said 
to have been allocated for investment 
in several key infrastructural projects 
for S&T in Serbia, through a joint loan 
with the European Investment Bank, 
World Bank and other international 
financial institutions and donations 
(MSTDRS 2009).
Figure 7: Proportions of R&D funding that come from governments, busi-
ness and enterprise sectors, higher education sectors, private non-profit 
sectors and abroad for different European countries, including the US, 
China, Japan and South Korea.  
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Figure 6: Number of ISI publications per million residents as a function 
of research funds in EUR per capita for most European countries, includ- 
ing China and the US.
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Diversification of R&D funding sourc-
es could thus be used as an indicator 
of how balanced scientific policies are 
in terms of the implementation ca-
pacity of discoveries and innovations 
produced at either academic or indus-
trial levels, and one such comparison 
of funding sources is displayed in Fig. 
7. The average funding for research 
coming from the business and en-
trepreneurial sectors equals ~ 70 % 
worldwide; in view of that, 60 % of 
funding for research related to the 
university sources in Serbia could be 
used as an indicator of underdevel-
oped academia-industry links.
4.8 Trends of recovery
An encouraging feature of the Serbian 
economy has been its exceptional re-
covery following the economic break-
down that followed the collapse of 
Yugoslavia and the times of the so-
cialist regime that pushed the country 
into a decade permeated with wars 
and international isolation. This is il-
lustrated in Fig. 8, which shows from 
1994 on an almost continual rise in 
the country’s GDP, with the excep-
tion of the 1998–2000 period, when 
the NATO bombing campaign and the 
Kosovo war left devastating traces 
on the local economy, and 2009 due 
to the effects of the global economic 
crisis.
The funds dedicated to research from 
public sources have thus been in in-
crease during the past decade. Hence, 
the absolute amount of investments 
added up to €18.1 per capita in 2007 
(cf. Table 4), €7.5 per capita in 2004, 
and only €1.5 per capita in 2000, 
which accounts for a 12-fold increase 
in the 2000–2007 period . However, 
as already mentioned, the relative 
amount of investment in science with 
respect to the GDP has not improved 
in the past decade. The current plan 
outlined by the Serbian Ministry of Sci-
ence is therefore to establish annual 
increases in R&D expenditures from 
the state budget over the next five 
years, as shown in Fig. 9, and reach 
the goal of 1 % of GDP by 2014. This 
plan seems particularly positive with 
Figure 8: GDP per capita for the 
Republic of Serbia without UN-
MIK/Kosovo in the 1990–2010 
period. Sources: IMF 2008, World 
Bank 2010, Aleksic´ 2001, UNECE 
2000. 
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Figure 9: The projected growth of 
governmental R&D expenditures 
on S&T in the 2009–2014 period. 
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Figure 10: Number of scientific 
publications affiliated with do-
mestic institutions for Serbia (-Δ-) 
and a few countries in the region, 
including Slovenia (-o-), Croatia 
(-□-), and Bulgaria (-◊-).
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regard to the opposite trend that some 
of the former Yugoslav states are un-
dergoing; for example, investments in 
R&D from the budget in Montenegro 
have been in constant decline: 0.83 % 
in 2001, 0.30 % in 2004 and 0.13 % in 
2006 (Vukc´ evic´  2009).
4.9 Other indicators
Also, as could be seen from Fig. 10, 
the number of papers published and 
originating in Serbian institutions has 
doubled in the period of 2004–2008, 
which is a significantly higher rate of 
growth compared to most countries in 
the region. Also, the overall costs per 
publication are lower than the Euro-
pean average. In the research group 
led by one of the authors, 48 ISI pub-
lications were produced in the period 
between 2005 and 2009, during which 
the funding was equal to €1 million, 
resulting in costs of €21,000 per publi-
cation, which is significantly less than 
the European Union average of ap-
proximately €74,000 per publication. 
The latter value was averaged for 
funding from the state budgets only; 
averaged for the total funds this cost 
would be equal to about €600,000 per 
publication, as can be seen from Table 
4, column 13. In fact, if costs per pub-
lication could be used as a measure 
of research efficiency, as of 2008, with 
the average costs per publication of 
€39,000, Serbia surpasses both Croa-
tia (€121,000) and Slovenia (€178,000) 
in this respect (MSTDRS 2009).
With more than 40 % of female re-
searchers, Serbia also represents a 
well balanced research population in 
terms of gender, and finds itself much 
ahead of the European Union average 
(~30 %), as shown in Fig. 11.
Finally, despite the significant brain 
drain, which certainly diminishes the 
quality of local research excellence, 
the age pyramid of the scientific com-
munity in Serbia does not show a sig-
nificant lack of young researchers and 
is comparable to most other European 
states, as can be seen from Fig. 12. 
5 Systemic set of strategies 
for the progress of devel-
oping countries
In order to reach the levels of devel-
opment that typify rich countries, the 
developing countries should ideally 
use the “leapfrog” tactics (Barro/Sala-
i-Martin 1997, Bernard/Jones 1996b, 
Bernard/Jones 1996a). There are 
many factors that lead to the leaders’ 
“stumbling” along the road of their 
Figure 11: Gender structure among research population for different Eu-
ropean countries, including Japan and South Korea.  
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progress, enabling their followers to 
catch-up, including rigid dependence 
on old-fashioned technologies (La-
zonick 1994), declining social welfare, 
political turmoil, ecological reckless-
ness and other mistakes that threaten 
their sustainability, typically result-
ing in a cycle of periods of ascension, 
growth plateau and fall (Olson 1984).
Accordingly, the developing countries 
are instigated to keep their eyes on 
the natural cycle of alternate progres-
sions and regressions that the devel-
oped countries experience, and dis-
cern the reasons behind these soars 
and slumps. As in accordance with the 
classical Schumpeter’s theory of crea-
tive destruction (Schumpeter 1962), 
it is the unending need to embrace 
new innovations and discard obsolete 
methods that hinders the progress of 
the leaders and gives a chance to the 
followers to reach the same level of 
development (Aghion/Howitt 1992). 
Studies have shown that more than 
50 % of long-term economic growth 
is connected with timely introduced 
technological innovations (Goldsmith 
1970). Development and adoption of 
new technologies is thus crucial in 
sustaining the international competi-
tiveness and economic growth (Kim/
Dahlman 1992).
5.1 Catching-up the developed 
countries
Mistakes and opportunities
Thereupon, instead of going through 
the same mistakes that the developed 
countries have committed, the devel-
oping countries would be able to cir-
cumvent them by implementing the 
right solutions even before immanent 
problems occur in the their own sys-
tems or by thinking ahead and com-
ing up with original innovations that 
would boost the local economies and 
increase the international competi-
tiveness. It has been shown that dur-
ing the past three decades, a number 
of late industrializing countries have 
sufficiently increased their levels of in-
novative productivity to compete with 
the former leaders in innovation, with 
South Korea, Taiwan, Ireland, Israel 
and Singapore being some of the ex-
amples (Furman/Hayes 2004).
Leapfrogging strategies
One such opportunity for developing 
countries to leapfrog a problematic 
development and thereby catch up 
with the developed states, are the eco-
logical flaws committed by the devel-
oped societies (Grubb 1990, Raufer/Li 
2009). Thus, instead of repeating the 
same instances of ecological reck-
lessness that have occurred in the de-
veloped world (UNEP 2005), the less 
developed countries could apply the 
policies for their prevention before 
the ecological problems become evi-
dent in reality (Biello 2007). In the past 
decade, an awareness of the challeng-
es to balance a continued economic 
growth while satisfying the require-
ments of sustainability has been in-
creased in the developing world. he 
retardation of the progress that this 
challenge will inevitably bring along, 
is seen as a great opportunity for the 
countries in developing stages to 
draw alongside the developed ones 
(Blinc et al. 2006).
Figure 12: Age structure of the 
research population in different 
European countries (left) and in 
Serbia (right). 
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Riding waves
It has already been suggested that 
as technological and scientific devel-
opment follows a similar sinusoidal 
path driven by the stages of concep-
tion, expectation, hype, saturation, 
over-hype and backlash, the ability to 
predict rises and surges of interests in 
given ideas or technologies is crucial 
in learning how to smoothly ride on 
these waves (Pearton 2007).
South Korea experienced alternate 
waves of soars and slumps in terms of 
R&D after gaining independence, and 
one such negative period of growth 
in manufacturing between 1960 and 
1987 was ascribed not only to a lack 
of investment in R&D, but also to in-
creasing reliance upon imitation, cap-
ital deepening, and scale economies 
to increase output (Park/Kwon 1995).
The “leapfrog” tactics in general pre-
sents a convenient mechanism for 
the gradual bridging of large gaps in 
prosperity that exist between the de-
veloped and the underdeveloped so-
cieties. In addition, this gap is con-
sidered as one of the brakes of an 
efficient and prosperous globalization 
in terms of preventing the possibilities 
for a convenient transfer of advanced 
know-how and new technologies (Ol-
son 1996). Implementing policies for 
its remission may thus turn out to be 
crucial for sustainability of the entire 
humanity.
Detrimental aspects
To satisfy the ideals of leapfrogging, 
a clear view of disadvantageous as-
pects of a scientific policy of growth 
has to be formed in parallel with the 
prosperous ones. A few of such detri-
mental aspects were selected for both 
the South Korean and the Slovenian 
case. For example, although South 
Korea indeed invests a relatively high 
percentage of its GDP to R&D, these 
high investments have required a suf-
ficiently propitious basis (including 
up-to-date equipment, productive in-
dustrial sectors and a thriving econo-
my) in which they would find a fertile 
ground to be able to induce truly pro-
ductive research.
Another drawback of the rapid stream-
ing to achieve extraordinary scientific 
productivity and secure one’s place in 
the field in the South Korean model 
has been the tendency to publish pre-
maturely and in journals with less 
intensive peer-review process and 
lower prestige. Yet, a study has shown 
that authors whose records weighed 
quality over quantity tended to be as-
sociated with more prestigious insti-
tutions (Haslam/Laham 2010).
On the other hand, science develops 
incrementally and a timely feedback 
from the scientific society is an impor-
tant drive for a successful research. It 
is, therefore, essential to find the right 
time to publish, and thus avoid both 
premature announcements of one’s 
accomplishments and retardation of 
the progress of the field by their pro-
longed concealment. To succeed in 
that, softening up the attitude that 
fosters competitiveness between indi-
vidual research groups and selflessly 
seeing scientific achievements as 
products of the scientific society and 
mankind as a whole may be required 
(Laband 1985).
Intellectual freedom
Yet another one of the mentioned 
drawbacks for the South Korean case 
was the tendency to neglect funda-
mental research on the account of the 
applied one. Many modern profes-
sional settings, including those that 
have traditionally fostered uptight and 
disciplined creative approaches, such 
as industries, are nowadays chang-
ing towards balancing the emphasis 
on sheer productivity with cultivating 
more intellectual freedom. Genen-
tech, the company celebrated for its 
pursuance of innovation and seven 
times selected as the “top employer 
in the biopharmaceutical industry” by 
Science magazine, most recently in 
2009, has adopted the merits of curi-
osity-driven research (Bonetta 2009).
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“No one from management can ask what a 
postdoc’s work has to do with the mission of 
the company. They are free to work on wha-
tever intrigues them”, a company’s executi-
ve said (Kaplan 2009).
Still, science remains an issue of pub-
lic interest because social values inev-
itably underlie scientific thinking and 
because even the most fundamental 
scientific studies are carried out while 
keeping an eye on how the findings 
could be applied for the sake of ele-
vating the quality of life.
However, the links between scientists 
and the governmental and corporate 
funding agencies in the developed 
world, which includes South Korea, 
have become so tight that the basic 
science that yields fundamental and 
long-term benefits often becomes de-
preciated in favour of applied research 
that is meant to bear fruits in short 
terms. Yet, as basic research is the 
substratum of the applied one (Bra-
ben 2008), the results of the former of-
ten lead to unforeseen but incredibly 
versatile ways of utilizing them. The 
cases of quantum mechanics, which 
was first used decades after its inven-
tion in the design of microelectronics, 
and molecular biology, the basic prin-
ciples of which are nowadays applied 
in drug discovery and other biotech-
nologies, may illustrate this point.
Commercialized science?
Still, in many developed countries uni-
versity research projects with a higher 
chance of commercialization are pre-
ferred in the funding selection pro-
cesses. However, too much focus on 
creating spin-offs without careful pri-
or analyses of their true potentials can 
be detrimental for the overall research 
quality (Nature Materials 2006). In en-
forcing policies that instigate push-
ing academic research to the com-
mercial level, another extreme may 
be reached, wherein corporate spirit 
would begin to pervade the freedom 
of thought that universities have fos-
tered for centuries (Washburn 2005).
As an example the case of the Yale 
University and the pharmaceutical 
company Bristol-Myers can be cited. 
Yale was generously funded by Bris-
tol-Myers, giving the exclusive manu-
facturing rights of the AIDS drug D4T 
in return.  It turned out that Bristol-
Myers was not able to produce D4T at 
a price affordable for the third world. 
But although competing pharmaceu-
tical companies could produce the 
drug at a considerably lower price, 
Yale claimed its hands were tied by 
an agreement signed with Bristol-
Myers. This practice is covered by the 
Bayh-Dole Act adopted in 1980, which 
gave universities intellectual property 
rights to federally funded research in 
the US. 
Lack of transparency
Failing to encourage smart and com-
petent methods for the allocation of 
research funds has been shown as 
another main threat for S&T policies 
of the developing countries. In Serbia, 
for example, the general lack of trans-
parency is reflected in the fact that 
governmental committees are partly 
involved in nomination and selection 
of heads of the research organiza-
tions, which similarly to other social 
domains indicates that fulfilling politi-
cal interests might be more important 
than claiming scientific or other types 
of professional excellence.
In view of the largest concentration of 
scientists at or around the academic 
and independent research institutions 
rather than within industrial centres, 
a novel and multidimensional meth-
od for financing research is needed. 
A recent analysis of the innovational 
character of S&T in Eastern European 
countries in transition has confirmed 
the role of universities and existing 
national knowledge bases comple-
mented by R&D commitments from 
both public and private sources as the 
main drivers of their innovative out-
put (Krammer 2009). Tax benefits and 
other incentives promoting partner-
ships between industry and academia 
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also present a vital feature of scientific 
and technological progress of a devel-
oping country (Etzkowitz 1998).
Cycle of productivity
Applied research is, as the name itself 
suggests, most productive when it is 
carried out on the basis of an already 
established infrastructural and indus-
trial prosperity. The first stage in the 
example of South Korean develop-
ment corresponded to technological 
and industrial improvements spurred 
by the cycle of export-oriented econo-
my, promotion of international recog-
nition and attraction of foreign inves-
tors (Chen/Sewell 1996). Only under 
these circumstances the  scientific 
productivity can be increased.
On the other hand, the success of basic 
research nowadays similarly depends 
on expensive high-tech equipment. 
Even though a general consequence 
of the post-World War II division to 
abundant funding of research in the 
West and poor funding in the East 
has predisposed researchers in the 
former regions to become more ori-
ented towards experimentation and 
the latter to attain strong theoretical 
capabilities (Nature Materials 2007b), 
theoretical research nowadays fre-
quently requires expensive computa-
tional equipment to satisfy the needs 
for competitive, high-quality simula-
tions and modelling (Johnson 2009).
However, this is not to say that there is 
no hope for basic research in less de-
veloped countries (Salam 1984). Quite 
contrary, the recent breakthroughs 
in simple and yet very efficient soft 
chemical methods of synthesis pro-
vide the opportunities for competition 
of low-cost experimental setups with 
expensive lithographic techniques, at 
least when the aspect of materials sci-
ence is concerned (Uskokovic´  V. 2007; 
Masala/Seshadri 2004). 
5.2 Systemic guidelines for sus-
tainable management
Global trends and local needs
Hence, a systemic guideline for devel-
oping countries would be to follow the 
steps of the developed world, and yet 
to be active and ready to implement 
actions to prevent the mistakes made 
in the very same developed world in 
due time. Based on economic predis-
positions and cultural and geographi-
cal background, each society requires 
a unique internal organization, while 
at the same time a certain level of 
similarity of the patterns of growth 
is to be expected among individual 
societies. As observed by the Brazil-
ian scientist and policy maker, José 
Goldemberg,
“We in developing countries should not ex-
pect to follow the research model that led to 
the scientific enterprise of the US and else-
where. Rather, we need to adapt and deve-
lop technologies appropriate to our local cir-
cumstances, help strengthen education, and 
expand our roles as advisers in both govern-
ment and industry. In this way, we can pre-
vent the brain-drain that results when scien-
tists are not in touch with the problems of 
their home countries or when they face indif-
ference – and poor financial support – from 
their governments.” (Goldemberg 1998)
The nationwide decision to switch 
from gasoline to ethanol, obtainable 
from sugarcane, the traditional crop 
in Brazil, as the major fuel can be used 
as an example of one such eco-tech-
nological idea created by focusing on 
local needs rather than on copying the 
trends existing in the developed world 
(Clendenning 2006).
Top-down and bottom-up
It is an old cliché that the correct ap-
proach in helping underprivileged so-
cieties is not to hand people their fish, 
but to teach them the art of fishing. In-
stead of a passive servitude promoted 
by the former approach, sustained 
social benefits could be fostered by 
the latter approach. Hence, instead 
of investing in tops of the frequent-
ly corrupt governments of the poor 
countries, the attitude of providing a 
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high-quality education and a fertile 
ground for the locally sustained eco-
nomic growth should become more 
pervasive.
Consequently, the route to develop-
ment occurs at the intersection of two 
directions: top-down and bottom-up. 
Whereas the former corresponds to 
the management of social relation-
ships by means of policies brought 
about from centralized hierarchical 
levels, the latter belongs to improve-
ments of the society at its fundamen-
tal organizational levels, including 
the provision of educational oppor-
tunities and generation of productive 
academic and industrial bases upon 
which scientific research would find a 
fertile ground.
This perspective may be said to fit 
the concept of the learning econo-
my coined by Bengt-Åke Lundvall. 
It encompasses both, the idea that 
high-quality education is rooted in 
productive and sustainable social or-
ganizations, and the core of the “leap-
frogging” approach, which implies an 
incessant orientation towards innova-
tion that narrows the gap between the 
followers and the leaders (Lundvall 
1999, 1992, 1995).
Good education is oftentimes con-
sidered the general recipe for social 
prosperity (Uskokovic´  2009a). When 
society invests in high-quality educa-
tion, which includes not only profes-
sional trainings, but general knowl-
edge, ethical teaching and upbringing 
in childhood as well, it gains an abil-
ity to live through hard times without 
reaching the states of civil anarchy. In 
accordance with the circular causal 
nature of physical phenomena in gen-
eral (Bateson 1972), the attempts to 
improve the rate of development of a 
given society in a politically hierarchi-
cal, top-down fashion sooner or later 
encounter complex circular causal 
chains in which each cause presents 
an effect and vice versa (Beer 1967).
It can thus be noted that in order to 
solve the problem of poverty, stable 
political and security bases should be 
set, which requires good educational 
foundations, for which the solution 
of existential poverty becomes the 
necessary precondition (Churchman 
1968). Sustaining a productive society 
can be thus said to lie in the coales-
cence of smart policies that descend 
down from the top levels of govern-
mental regulations, and promotion of 
valuable education that extends from 
the invisible foundations of the soci-
ety up. 
Smart policies
Also, in the context of globalization 
and internationalization, a develop-
ing society should maintain the bal-
ance between preserving its cultural 
bases and fostering openness to infor-
mation exchange with the rest of the 
world (Kelly 1995). Forms of openness 
to external influences that erase the 
cultural background of the society or 
closeness to international communi-
cation driven by fears that the nation-
al heritage would be diminished both 
deviate from the optimal, middle way 
approaches.
Openness that allows for facile trans-
mission of technical information has 
been shown to encourage research-
ers and entrepreneurs to innovate 
and pursue the most up-to-date ap-
proaches and technologies (Gross-
man/Helpman 1993). It also broadens 
the market size and leads to realloca-
tion of resources that may positively 
affect growth.
On the other hand, focusing on tech-
nological solutions that satisfy local 
needs rather than looking after com-
peting on the international scene at 
every cost, even though the discov-
eries arrived at may never be imple-
mented locally, may prevent futile dis-
sipations of research creativity.
Human nature
This guideline is, in fact, consistent 
with both the nature of perception 
and biological constitution of human 
beings (Glasersfeld 1996). Firstly, per-
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ceptual experiences proceed from 
within the brain as much as they are 
being influenced by the sensual detec-
tion of physical features of the sur-
rounding world (Uskokovic´ 2009c). 
Secondly, biological creatures are in-
trinsically built on the principle of bal-
ancing thermodynamic openness and 
operational closeness (Maturana/
Varela 1987). 
Namely, whereas the former explains 
for the exchange of matter, energy and 
information with the environment, in 
which the living creatures need to be 
constantly engaged in order to main-
tain their physical structures, the lat-
ter is descriptive of closed metabolic 
loops that comprise biological entities 
and are essential in preserving their 
integrity and autonomy, preventing 
their disintegrative dissipation into 
the environment.
Naturally, we imitate others and pri-
marily those who we admire and 
whom we aspire to become. Yet, 
without sanely being in touch with 
our own inner source of creativity, 
such an imitational approach would 
turn us into blind followers of leaders 
and authorities of the world, prone to 
manipulation and not living up to the 
fullest of our creative potentials.
Cultural diversity of societies
The same can be said to be valid for 
countries and societies of the world: 
the sense of respect would natural-
ly yield a healthy dose of imitation, 
whereas a focus on building original 
and unique social bases of welfare 
and prosperity starting from the local 
scale and certainly comprising heavy 
investments in research would maxi-
mize fulfilment of the creative poten-
tials of the given society and eventu-
ally promote cultural diversification of 
the planet instead of threatening it by 
the extensive imitation of the leaders. 
“Focus and Partner”, the slogan given 
for the development plan for S&T in 
Serbia by the Ministry of S&T, nicely 
captures this balance between co-
operative openness and operational 
closeness (MSTDRS 2009).
Local needs
It has been witnessed that techno-
logical design and industrial solutions 
shown as successful in the context of 
a developed society may turn out to 
be impractical and inefficient when 
straightforwardly introduced into a 
less developed society (Schumach-
er 2000). An example of innovation 
aimed at suiting primarily the local 
needs and yet open to international 
transfer of knowledge is given by a 
Slovakian team of scientists that com-
mercialized a nanobiocomposite elec-
trode for in situ analysis of wine com-
ponents, thus linking nanotechnology 
with the traditional winemaking in an 
inexpensive and elegant way (Tkac et 
al. 2007).
Sustainable management
Adjusting the technological perfor-
mance of a small country to its size 
and to local needs and capabilities 
should present only an aspect of a 
wider social plan of economically and 
ecologically sustainable management 
(Uskokovic´  2008). Considering the fact 
that rich countries have based their 
progress on an overall degradation 
of the underlying natural capital, the 
chance of the developing countries to 
overtake the developed societies lies 
exactly in timely adoption of progres-
sive ecological policies.
In that sense, Serbia could learn a lot 
from Germany and the way in which 
it transformed its destructive nation-
alism of the World War II era into one 
of the most influential environmental 
conservation movements. With the 
right incentives from the international 
community and appropriate tech-
nological and educational policies, 
a similarly devastating nationalism, 
arising of which followed the break-
down of Yugoslavia, could be trans-
formed into a truer and more produc-
tive “love of the land”.
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The opening passage by Nikola Tesla 
demonstrates one such balance be-
tween a locally oriented patriotism 
and a working dedication to the en-
tire humanity. With such an approach, 
hopes remain that the Berlin Wall of 
international isolation that has taken 
an enormous toll on the intellectual 
potential of Serbia could be toppled 
down. The local political and social 
problems would thus become only 
remnants of the faint past of a society 
which is soon to be transformed into a 
vital member of the European science 
and economy.
6 Conclusion
By comparing the two cases of fairly 
prosperous scientific management, of 
South Korea and Slovenia, with chal-
lenges tied with poor scientific and 
industrial productivity, typical for the 
developing countries and illustrated 
on the example of Serbia, a few guide-
lines for the evolution of a society 
towards higher scientific and social 
prominence were outlined.
Establishing innovation-fostering ac-
ademia-industry partnerships, which 
would promote research with high ap-
plicative potentials in addition to that 
pertaining to fundamental discoveries 
was laid out as a part of the solution. 
Prioritizing R&D areas through na-
tional research programs and reform-
ing the higher education sector to fol-
low the local demands of the society 
were also discussed as positive fac-
tors in integrating scientific potentials 
of a developing country within its to-
tal economic performance. The most 
favourable pattern of growth should 
be based on the parallel control of sci-
entific and fiscal policies on one side 
and the excellence of basic education 
and scientific training on the other.
To succeed in this dream of raising 
a society with an average scientific 
and technological performance into 
clouds of excellence, embedment into 
international science and engineer-
ing networks is required as much as 
strong local scientific and technologi-
cal bases. The former would be vital 
in maintaining up-to-date R&D inter-
ests and priorities, whereas the latter 
would provide a fertile ground for an 
efficient transfer and implementa-
tion of the foreign-based capital and 
knowledge.
Systemic nature of progress
Furthermore, the signs of healthy pro-
gress of any given society or natural 
system are evident in the parallel de-
velopment of communicational com-
plexity between their constitutive en-
tities and of their intrinsic versatility. 
In their healthy states, natural systems 
are diversified and functionally differ-
entiated as much as they are unified 
and well integrated. Once this sys-
temic property of progress becomes 
openly recognized, both rich and poor 
countries would gain responsibility to 
promote it at their respective organi-
zational levels.
The former should primarily reorient 
towards ensuring not only fair trans-
actions in terms of short-term reci-
procity, but primarily long-term so-
cially, economically and ecologically 
sustainable interactions between the 
developed and underdeveloped coun-
tries of the world, which would foster 
the appropriate systemic balance be-
tween unity and diversity. The devel-
oping countries have the same task, 
which is to be carried out in far small-
er domains.
And we, individual human beings, in 
accordance with the tradition of wis-
dom and ethics of our civilization, are 
responsible to pay attention to the im-
portance of the invisible roots of sci-
ence, thought and creativity as much 
as on the measurable welfare. For, in 
the end, what this paper has primar-
ily aimed at is to provide a glimpse of 
a profound education as standing at 
the foundations of a truly sustainable 
society.
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7 Appendix: The bibliograph-
ic analysis method
The major part of the statistical data 
used in the analysis was drawn from 
various Eurostat databases available 
online. All the data are from 2007 be-
cause the statistics for 2008 and 2009 
are incomplete. In case Eurostat (Eu-
rostat 2010) did not provide data on 
a particular indicator, we used other 
primary sources like the CIA World 
Factbook (CIA 2010) and the data-
bases of the Statistical Office of the 
Republic of Serbia (Statistical Office of 
the Republic of 2010b), and secondary 
sources, like the policy document of 
the Ministry of Science and Techno-
logical Development of the Republic 
of Serbia Scientific and Technological 
Development Strategy of the Repub-
lic of Serbia, 2010–2015 (Ministry of 
Science and Technological Develop-
ment of the Republic of Serbia 2009). 
Estimations were made only when 
it was not possible to draw reliable 
data from the primary and secondary 
sources and they were calculated on 
the basis of the known parameters. 
Bibliometric data, primarily related 
to the number of publications written 
by authors coming from a particular 
country or area and indexed by the 
International Scientific Institute (ISI), 
were drawn from the Web of Sci-
ence® with Conference Proceedings, 
namely from the following databas-
es: Science Citation Index Expanded 
(SCI-EXPANDED) – 1996–present, 
Social Sciences Citation Index (SSCI) 
– 1996–present, Arts & Humanities Ci-
tation Index (A&HCI) – 1996-present, 
Conference Proceedings Citation In-
dex – Science (CPCI-S) – 2001-present, 
and Conference Proceedings Citation 
Index – Social Science & Humanities 
(CPCI-SSH) – 2001–present. In order 
to draw relevant data, we performed 
a series of advanced searches limit-
ing search parameters to the follow-
ing document types: “Article”, “Pro-
ceeding Paper” and “Review”, and the 
time span “2007”. Having in mind that 
search results usually include a num-
ber of documents from years before or 
after, though the time span is speci-
fied in the initial search, they were 
further refined using the “Publication 
Year” filter. In order to retrieve data for 
the United Kingdom, the terms “Great 
Britain”, “England”, “Wales”, “Scot-
land”, and “Northern Ireland” were 
included in the search, whereas for 
the Russian Federation we included 
the names of a dozen major cities as 
search terms. Since the number of 
documents retrieved in the searches 
related to the European Union (EU 
27, EU 15 and EU 16) and the United 
States of America was beyond the 
search limit (100,000), it was neces-
sary to make estimation. The estima-
tions were made on the basis of data 
provided by the Web of Science: in a 
series of separate searches we estab-
lished the number of relevant docu-
ments (“Article”, “Proceeding Paper” 
and “Review”) in the Social Sciences 
Citation Index (SSCI) – 1996–present, 
Arts & Humanities Citation Index 
(A&HCI) – 1996-present and Confer-
ence Proceedings Citation Index – So-
cial Science & Humanities (CPCI-SSH) 
– 2001–present; and the number of 
Proceeding Papers and Reviews in 
the Science Citation Index Expanded 
(SCI-EXPANDED) – 1996–present and 
Conference Proceedings Citation In-
dex – Science (CPCI-S) – 2001-pre-
sent; having in mind that the share of 
Articles in the Science Citation Index 
Expanded (SCI-EXPANDED) – 1996–
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present and Conference Proceedings 
Citation Index – Science (CPCI-S) – 
2001-present for other countries is 
about 70 percent (as we calculated it), 
it was easy to calculate the estimated 
number of Articles for the European 
Union and the United States of Amer-
ica and add it to the results of the per-
formed searches. 
The data related to the costs of a sin-
gle ISI publication were calculated 
from the figures obtained from the 
Web of Science® with Conference 
Proceedings and those drawn from 
Eurostat databases. There are several 
parameters in Table 4 that have to do 
with the funds allocated to R&D. The 
idea was to give a multifaceted view 
of R&D expenditures by presenting 
absolute amounts (column “Total re-
search funds and funds from the budg-
et in millions of EUR”), by normalizing 
them per GDP and population (col-
umns “Total research funds and funds 
from the budget in % of GDP” and “To-
tal research funds and funds from the 
budget per capita”), and by highlight-
ing the structure of R&D funding and 
the share of R&D expenditures in the 
overall government budget (column 
“Total GBAORD as a % of total gen-
eral government expenditures”). Total 
research funds include funding from: 
(a) government; (b) business and en-
terprise sector; (c) higher education 
sector; (d) private non-profit sector; 
and (e) abroad, i.e., both the funds 
allocated by the government (a) and 
funding from other sources (b-e). Re-
search funds from the budget (a) in-
clude merely the R&D funds provided 
by the government. This parameter is 
called Government Budget Appropria-
tions or Outlays for Research and De-
velopment, abbreviated as GBAORD. 
According to the definition provided 
by Eurostat, it includes “all appropria-
tions (government spending) given to 
R & D in central (or federal) govern-
ment budgets”. In Table 4, EPO stands 
for the European Patent Office.
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The mixed blessing of Mode 2 knowledge production
Laurens K. Hessels (University of Utrecht, The Netherlands)
Harro van Lente (University of Utrecht, The Netherlands)
The notion of Mode 2 knowledge pro-
duction (Gibbons et al. 1994, Nowotny 
et al. 2001) already has a remarkable 
history. It was launched fifteen years 
ago to capture the ongoing changes 
in the world of science, science policy 
and the knowledge economy at large. 
While it is not the only attempt to make 
sense of the change, it definitively is the 
most popular. Since its publication in 
1994, ‘The New Production of Knowl-
edge’ (Gibbons et al. 1994), which 
has coined the notions of Mode 1 and 
Mode 2, has received almost 1900 ci-
tations in scientific journals (see Fig-
ure 1). It is a blessing that it has helped 
both scholars and policymakers to get 
a grip on the profound changes going 
on in contemporary science systems. 
But the concept of Mode 2 knowledge 
production also proved to be a mixed 
blessing by creating confusion and by 
conflating interrelated yet independ-
ent trends. 
In our 2008 review of literature about 
changing science systems, we identified 
and discussed a number of problems 
related to the concept of Mode 2 
knowledge production (Hessels & van 
Lente 2008). We concluded that most 
of them can be summarized under two 
headings, limited empirical support 
and conceptual weaknesses. First, 
there is no (fully) convincing evidence 
available for the claim that science is 
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Figure 1: Number of citations of The New Production of Knowledge  
(Gibbons et al., 1994) in Scopus1
1 Scopus search on June 14th 2010. Total 
number of citations (including 2010): 1879. 
The apparent decrease in 2009 is probably 
due to the delayed publication of some 
journals. 
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indeed increasingly characterized by 
the five features that together define 
Mode 2 knowledge production. For 
some of these attributes there is quite 
some empirical support (such as the 
increasing heterogeneity of science), 
but some other are disputed, such 
as the claims about novel quality 
control and the increasing reflexivity 
of knowledge production. Second, the 
notion of Mode 2 and the concomitant 
diagnosis is poorly embedded in 
sociological literature, and questions 
have been raised about the mutual 
coherence of its five constitutive 
features.
Two papers published in a recent is-
sue of STI-Studies (Hansen 2009, Ku-
rath 2009) can be read as attempts to 
address these two problems. Janus 
Hansen outlines a possible theoretical 
enrichment of the debate about Mode 
2 by introducing the rich tradition of 
Luhmann and other systems thinkers; 
Monika Kurath provides an empirical 
analysis of the social robustness of 
nanoscience and -technology (NST) 
governance arrangements. Both pa-
pers, we think, testify to the status of 
Mode 2 as a mixed blessing. 
Reaction to Kurath
The rise of nanosciences and –tech-
nologies (NST) has been accompanied 
with many promises and concerns 
regarding the economic and societal 
potential of this emerging field (van 
Lente & van Til 2008). In many coun-
tries funding schemes for NST have 
been launched in the last decade, as 
well as attempts to anticipate and reg-
ulate possible outcomes. Kurath has 
made a timely overview of the vari-
ous approaches, under the heading of 
public engagement, and draws on the 
Mode 2 ideas on ‘social robustness’ to 
assess these attempts. The outcomes 
of Kurath’s analysis (2009) are sur-
prising. Of all fourteen self-regulatory 
and soft-law approaches, and all six 
public engagement projects she has 
investigated, only three score posi-
tively on her social robustness scale, 
and none of them scores really high. 
For example, both the UK Responsible 
Nano Code 2008 and the EU Nano-
logue 2005-2006 score negatively on 
the criteria ‘stability’ and ‘acceptabil-
ity’. 
This is surprising because the need 
for socially robust knowledge is one 
of the key claims of the influential 
Mode 2 diagnosis, and the govern-
ance of NST can be expected to be 
a very suitable setting for it. With its 
high uncertainty about potential risks 
and benefits and the high stakes in-
volved, NST deserves careful govern-
ance. Governments, industry and the 
other actors involved can be expected 
not to rely on conventional policy in-
struments. To put it in stronger terms: 
if there is one technological domain 
deserving to be handled with the most 
innovative, participatory and robust 
approaches available, it is NST. And 
yet, as Kurath’s results seem to imply, 
these attempts are all failing.
Does this mean that NST governance 
is still following a traditional modern-
ist approach, characterized by lim-
ited accountability and democracy? 
In our opinion there are two explana-
tions for Kurath’s surprising outcome, 
a conceptual and an empirical one. 
First, the conceptual explanation may 
be found in the way Kurath has used 
the notion of social robustness in her 
analysis. While this notion was intro-
duced to characterize knowledge and 
knowledge production, Kurath applies 
it to governance schemes. In principle 
it makes sense to think about socially 
robust governance as well, but this 
requires a careful reconsideration of 
the definition of social robustness (see 
also Rip, this issue). The paper, how-
ever, directly translates the charac-
teristics of socially robust knowledge 
as presented by Nowotny et al. (2001) 
into five ‘criteria’ of social robustness 
and uses them as criteria of govern-
ance schemes. Kurath pays little at-
tention to the differences between a 
research project and a governance 
arrangement. Characteristics such 
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as ‘stability’ and ‘acceptability’ have 
quite a different meaning in these two 
different contexts. The conceptual 
shift leads to various difficulties, for 
instance to the paradoxical situation 
that the stability of a soft-law govern-
ance scheme is measured by the de-
gree to which outcomes are ‘enforce-
able’. Kurath could have stayed closer 
to the Mode 2 ideas of social robust-
ness, if she had chosen to analyze 
governance for socially robust nano-
sciences and -technologies (NST) in-
stead of the social robustness of NST 
governance.
The empirical explanation for Ku-
rath’s surprising findings would be the 
discrepancy between the popular and 
innovative ideas about social robust-
ness that have inspired the various 
participatory and democratic govern-
ance arrangements in the first place, 
and the inert practices of science and 
technology governance that inhibit 
their implementation. Clearly the 
use of social knowledge and mutual 
learning is not a straightforward ‘in-
strument’ but increases the complex-
ity and unpredictability of the process. 
This type inertia can be compared to 
the phenomenon we observed in the 
dynamics of academic research prac-
tices. Our fieldwork on Dutch universi-
ty research shows that funding sourc-
es provide incentives for researchers 
to promise strongly contextualized 
research, but that the limited rewards 
for fulfilling these promises almost 
nullify these incentives (Hessels et al. 
2009). In practice the dominant reward 
structure of university research is not 
compatible with all attributes of Mode 
2 knowledge production and it exerts 
a conservative force on the dynamics 
of university research. Research eval-
uations, ruled by bibliometric qual-
ity indicators, favor traditional forms 
of knowledge above socially robust 
knowledge. They typically give most 
credits to mono-disciplinary achieve-
ments that can be published in high-
impact scientific journals (Weingart 
2005). The criteria ruling formal eval-
uation procedures also shape infor-
mal processes of gaining credibility 
and building reputations. As a con-
sequence, transdisciplinary research, 
or strong engagement with societal 
stakeholders yields little recognition. 
In a similar vein, the pressure for ac-
countability of NST governance may 
also indirectly restrict the possibilities 
for more democratic governance ar-
rangements: participation may simply 
be too expensive.
Reaction to Hansen
The diagnosis of Mode 2 can 
also be enriched with theoretical 
strands. Hansen (2009) seeks to 
enrich the discussion with the 
work of Niklas Luhmann. A central 
tenet of this framework is the 
understanding of society as a set of 
relatively independent systems of 
communication. To rephrase and 
enrich the claims about Mode 2, Hansen 
suggests distinguishing between 
two levels of social reality: ‘societal 
sub-systems’ and ‘organizations’. 
According to Luhmann, societal 
sub-systems, such as science and 
the economy, can be seen as self-
referential systems, operating by 
means of mutually exclusive, binary 
codes of communication, like true/
false and payment/non-payment. 
Although these systems are locked 
into each other, they are autonomous 
in their operations. Unlike these 
sub-systems, organizations have 
‘members’, of which there are 
‘behavioural expectations’. Moreover, 
organizations recursively make 
decisions that shape their identity. 
Together, the notions of societal sub-
systems and organizations would 
allow an analysis of both stability and 
change in the ongoing transformation 
of knowledge production. As Hansen 
rightfully argues, there cannot be only 
change and the blurring of boundaries.
The Mode 2 diagnosis, then, can be 
translated in this framework by the 
following two claims: (i) the structural 
couplings between the societal sub-
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systems are becoming stronger, for 
example between science and poli-
tics; (ii) new types of organizations are 
evolving, operating at the intersection 
of a multiplicity of subsystems, for ex-
ample technology transfer offices that 
form a bridge between science and 
the economy.
Hansen’s paper shows that the Luh-
mannian framework provides op-
portunities for further analysis of the 
Mode 2 diagnosis. The concept of 
Mode 2 suffers from its enthusias-
tic reception: due to its wide scope 
and universal appeal, everyone can 
use the term as he likes, which com-
plicates systematic comparisons. 
Thanks to its conceptual clarity and 
coherence, the framework presented 
by Hansen could facilitate gathering 
and comparing data about public en-
gagement in different scientific fields 
and national contexts. 
However, to this end, there is still 
work to do. Hansen’s suggestions 
for empirical research’ are rather ab-
stract, and do not provide concrete 
starting points for scholars willing to 
adopt his approach. The questions he 
raises (e.g. ‘Where and how are pub-
lic engagement procedures anchored 
institutionally?’ (p. 85)) are interest-
ing, but they are insufficiently specific. 
What is lacking is an operationaliza-
tion of the Luhmannian concepts into 
empirically measurable indicators. 
What kind of data should one collect 
in order to investigate structural cou-
plings between societal subsystems? 
In particular, the framework is still 
open with regard to the cross-na-
tional comparisons that Hansen ad-
vocates. The three dimensions of po-
litical culture borrowed from Jasanoff 
(2005), should ‘serve as a tool to order 
observations of local or “institutional” 
specifications into how science inter-
acts with politics, the economy and 
the legal system’ (Hansen 2009 p. 81). 
However, ‘representation’, ‘participa-
tion’ and ‘deliberation’ are quite gen-
eral characteristics of public engage-
ment in different contexts. Again, 
what types of data could be used in an 
empirical analysis of these variables? 
And how do these variables relate to 
the Luhmannian subsystems and or-
ganizations?
An important characteristic of Luh-
mann’s approach, and ipso facto also 
of Hansen’s framework is that it uses 
communication as the entrance point 
for studying social reality. A risk of 
starting with communication patterns 
is that practices and agency may re-
main obscured. With regard to sci-
ence, one runs the risk of overlooking 
the content of science and the dynam-
ics of actual research practices. As the 
success of the field of scientometrics 
shows, publications can serve as val-
uable indicators of research practices, 
but they miss some aspects of the 
practices as well. Collaboration pat-
terns, for example, are known to be 
only partly reflected in co-authorships 
(Laudel 2002). Also content analysis 
of scientific publications can be de-
ceptive, as researchers may strategi-
cally adopt fashionable terms, with-
out actually changing their research 
activities. 
Another possible route to theoretical-
ly embed the Mode 2 claims is to put 
the research practices central. Else-
where (Hessels et al. 2009) we have 
outlined, that it is fruitful to analyze 
the changing research practices with 
the credibility cycle (Latour & Wool-
gar 1986). This model, which is rooted 
in a constructivist tradition, explains 
how struggles for reputation influence 
the behaviour of individual scientists. 
Scientists possess different forms of 
credibility, which function as resourc-
es to be invested and earned back in 
another form. Conceived in this way, 
the research process can be depicted 
as a repetitive cycle in which con-
versions take place between money, 
staff, data, arguments, articles, recog-
nition, and so on. 
An analysis of this cycle gives power-
ful insights into the changes in actual 
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practices of university research. It fa-
cilitates investigation of the agency 
of scientists, influenced by changing 
structural conditions. It also helps to 
differentiate the Mode 2 claims for dif-
ferent scientific fields. In some fields, 
such as Catalysis and Paleo-ecology, 
the orientation on practical outcomes 
has strengthened over the past 35 
years. In fields like Biochemistry and 
Cell Biology, however, the traditional 
academic orientation was conserved 
and even strengthened by the in-
creased pressure for academic publi-
cations. In other words, Mode 2 char-
acteristics are becoming more visible 
in some fields, while they remain ab-
sent in others. Differences between 
the fields can be further explained by 
their communication culture, social 
organization and characteristics of 
their societal stakeholders.
To conclude
The notion of Mode 2 has proved to 
be an important step towards both 
the visibility and the understanding 
of important trends in contemporary 
science systems. Yet, it is also a 
source of questions and confusion. 
Conceptually, it is still underdeveloped 
and prone to further refinement. 
Empirically, its arguments are too 
brittle and equivocal to be used as 
a basis for convincing assessments 
and interventions. In the attempt to 
address these weaknesses, Hansen 
and Kurath seem to have divided 
the enrichment labour. While one 
focussed on theoretical enrichment, 
the other made an empirical effort. 
We would recommend them to join 
forces. To turn the notion of Mode 
2 into a blessing of a better mix, a 
balanced combination of conceptual 
refinement and empirical testing is 
needed. 
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Social Robustness and the Mode 2 Diagnosis
Arie Rip (University of Twente, The Netherlands)
The Hansen and Kurath articles in 
the December 2009 issue have public 
engagement as their topic, and mobi-
lize the notion of ‘social robustness’ 
as discussed by Helga Nowotny, one 
of the Mode 2 authors (see Nowotny 
et al. 2001). Janus  Hansen used it as 
a link with public engagement and 
offered a plea for comparative stud-
ies which he located in a conceptual 
critique of the Mode 2 thesis. Monika 
Kurath decided to use her version of 
the notion of ‘social robustness’ to 
evaluate attempts at regulation of, 
and engagement with, nanosciences 
and nanotechnologies, conjuring up 
ratings for each of the cases she de-
scribed.
Social robustness
Monika Kurath  (2009: 90) assumes 
that the notion of social robustness is 
linked to the authors of the diagnosis 
of the Mode 2 of knowledge produc-
tion, but the notion and the practice 
have a longer history. In particular, 
learning in and through controver-
sies can be mapped and evaluated in 
terms of social robustness (see Rip 
1986 and the literature referred to 
there). It applies to science-internal 
as well as science-external criteria of 
quality, and offers a comprehensive 
approach.  Drawing on Stirling et al. 
(1999) and (Rip 2001), the approach 
can be formulated in three steps. 
First, solidity of scientific achievments 
as well as of outcomes of controver-
sies is a matter of alignment of find-
ings, arguments, perceptions, in-
terests, and dominant values – and 
circumstances. Quality and validity 
are made, and the ‘robustness’ of such 
constructions shows in its resiliency 
with respect to disturbances and in-
terventions. The eventual alignment 
creates a repertoire of considerations 
which are difficult to go against (see 
the example of the smoking-health 
link, below). In that sense, the out-
come is robust, even if it can be un-
dermined when new arguments, in-
terests, or values unravel the existing 
alignment.  
Second, robustness resides in the 
combination of consolidation and 
well-articulated alignment. The 
smoking-health link, for example, 
was strongly implicated in the prohi-
bition of smoking in some USA states 
around 1900, the argument being that 
smoking is what morally depraved in-
dividuals do (so it must be prohibited) 
and will lead to diseases (as punish-
ment for their sins). This not very well 
articulated alignment broke down in 
and after the first world war, when the 
cultural aspects of smoking cigarettes 
shifted. Citizen groups started to send 
cigarettes to soldiers because the cig-
arette was an “indispensable comfort 
to the men.” Moral associations now 
became positive, the cigarette being 
identified with “quiet dignity, courage, 
and dedication above all.” (Troyer and 
Markle 1983, p. 40-41) In contrast, by 
the 1970s, after extended controver-
sies, the smoking-health link had been 
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articulated in great detail, and cultur-
al shifts (for example, the attempt to 
link smoking with individual freedom) 
could not undermine the “edifice” that 
had been constructed. (Rip 1986)
Third, antagonistic (and in general, 
agonistic) struggles provide coordina-
tion and learning: they force actors to 
articulate the merits of their position, 
to search for arguments and counter-
arguments, to commission special re-
search, to interact with more actors. 
Of course, such struggles can also 
lead to impasses, when parties limit 
themselves to mutual labeling the 
other as contemptibly wrong. 
One can turn the understanding of ag-
onistic alignment dynamics into ways 
to do better. This is how one can un-
derstand Nowotny et al.’s call for so-
cial robustness: they want to do better 
by strengthening the input of society 
(“speaking back to science”). Howev-
er, this “doing better” is then reduced 
to interaction with and acceptability 
to publics, as Hansen and Kurath do 
as well. There is little attention to the 
question why this would contribute to 
doing better.  
Other approaches to “do better” could 
be entertained. A concrete example 
is the SocRobust project (Larédo et al 
2002), which developed ways to ex-
tend the horizon of managers of tech-
no-scientific projects so as to improve 
eventual embedding of the (modified) 
projects in society. Constructive Tech-
nology Assessment (cf. Schot and Rip 
1997) has the same overall goal, and 
has by now developed effective and 
reflexive ways to broaden techno-
scientific developments, e.g. nano-
sciences and nanotechnologies, start-
ing with the immediate and secondary 
“enactors” of innovations (Rip and Te 
Kulve 2008).
Implications of the broader  
approach
One implication of this approach is 
that ‘social’ is superfluous as a quali-
fier: robustness is always social. The 
qualifier serves to push interactions 
with society, but that may background 
other important aspects of robust-
ness, depending on circumstances. It 
may also induce shifts, as when Ku-
rath (e.g. 89) focuses on robustness 
of governance, rather than of knowl-
edge or innovations. She creates five 
dimensions on which to rate exer-
cises in regulation and engagement. 
The added value of this evaluation, 
which are only tenuously connected 
with the Nowotny et al concept, is not 
clear because they are not operation-
alized sufficiently to allow the reader 
to recognize why the scores are given. 
Sometimes, the rating expresses en-
thusiasm about intentions rather than 
actual outcomes, for example with the 
UK NanoJury – which was a failure, I 
would argue, but is now rated highly 
by Kurath.
Similarly, Hansen (71-72) claims that 
“the image of ‘social robustness’ cap-
tures well the overall ambition of most 
public engagement processes what-
ever their specific format. The aim of 
most public engagement processes – 
at least according to their self-under-
standing – is to draw in various ways 
upon the experiences, knowledge and 
concerns of ‘ordinary people’ in order 
to develop science and technology in 
better accordance with the broader 
values and goals of the societies into 
which they are introduced.” However, 
most exercises in public engagement 
are symbolic: “See, we have engaged”, 
and not interested in better develop-
ment of science and technology. 
This is a critique of Hansen and Ku-
rath, but also a stepping stone to-
wards a critique of Mode 2. Hansen 
offers a lead into this, because his 
comments about the Mode 2 diagno-
sis are general and conceptual, not 
depending on the nature of public 
engagement exercises and their insti-
tutionalization.  His key point is that 
the Mode 2 approach “fails to distin-
guish analytically between changes 
in the mutual interaction between 
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societal subsystems and changes oc-
curring in the organisations produc-
ing and governing innovation.” (p. 
73) His reference to Luhmann here is 
less important than his subsequent at-
tempt to capture what is happening by 
introducing the notion of ‘resonance’ 
between societal subsystems, and the 
idea of organizations having to oper-
ate in different contexts (with different 
‘codes’)  at the same time.  The Mode 
2 diagnosis can then be positioned as 
a specific cross-section of this com-
plex constellation, focusing on moves 
of organizations to accommodate 
new contexts.  However, Hansen does 
not develop this further because he 
is more interested in cross-national 
comparisons, and mobilizes ideas 
of Jasanoff to indicate dimensions of 
comparisons. 
Mode 2 revisited?
What if one develops the multi-level 
perspective further? Should one revis-
it the Mode 2 diagnosis even if by now 
the original energy of the diagnosis 
has been spent? The ongoing changes 
discussed under the heading of Mode 
2 are real, but the claim that they add 
up to a new regime is doubtful (espe-
cially in its triumphant version of the 
original 1994 publication). The claim 
of Mode 2 became a policy fashion 
(Rip 2000), but the policy agendas 
have moved on.  But it was also an 
attempt to diagnose ongoing trans-
formations. Even when one disagrees 
with the diagnosis, one can still learn 
from the attempt. 
This is where Hansen’s criticism of 
the Mode 2 diagnosis as empirically 
located at the level of organizations, 
rather than at the societal level where 
de-differentiation is claimed to oc-
cur, is valuable, independently of the 
reference to Luhmann.  More rel-
evant for an evaluation of the diag-
nosis of a Mode 2 Society (Nowotny 
et al. 2001) is Ulrich Beck’s  work on 
reflexive modernization (Beck et al. 
1994). Many features of Mode 2 are 
instances of blurring of boundaries, a 
key dimension of reflexive moderni-
zation.  While Beck’s programmatic 
diagnosis of first and second moder-
nity (broadening his 1992 diagnosis of 
the risk society) is just as triumphant 
, and thus analytically disappointing, 
as in the original Mode 2 diagnosis, 
there is also an understanding of re-
institutionalization as the reflexive 
construction of new boundaries and 
differentiations (Beck and Lau 2005, 
contra Nowotny et al (2001: 17) some-
what superficial critique).
There have been interesting empirical 
studies in Beck’s DFG-funded Sonder-
forschungsbereich which show the 
interactions between the societal and 
organizational levels (see <www.
sfb536.mwn.de>, cf. also Beck and 
Lau, 2005). With Pierre Delvenne, I 
have contributed to such empirical 
analyses by tracing changes in science 
institutions like funding agencies and 
Parliamentary TA organizations, and 
positioning them as instances of an 
overall pathway of reflexive moderni-
zation (Delvenne 2010, Delvenne and 
Rip submitted). 
The question about the value of the 
Mode 2 diagnosis (revisited) then 
shifts to a broader question about new 
regimes of knowledge production that 
might emerge under changing soci-
etal circumstances and challenges. 
A key entrance point to address this 
question is how conditions and re-
quirements for societal robustness 
of knowledge production are chang-
ing, and what the responses are from 
within the established system of (sci-
entific) knowledge production, and 
from without. In Rip (2000) I offered 
a plea to postpone stabilization (i.e. a 
lock-in in a new regime) and be will-
ing to entertain heterogeneity.  This 
was a process argument, but based 
on the substantial diagnosis that the 
emerging regime of ‘Strategic Science’ 
would get locked-in prematurely. One 
normative evaluation included in this 
diagnosis was how techno-scientific 
promises lead to a focus on competi-
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tion through (fast) innovation, which 
then backgrounds alternative innova-
tion dynamics of ‘collective experi-
mentation’ (Joly et al. 2010). These 
arguments still apply.
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Over the last years, the intense and 
vivid debates which had developed 
around the so called mode 2 thesis 
after the publication of “The New Pro-
duction of Knowledge” (Gibbons et 
al. 1994) and “Re-Thinking Science” 
(Nowotny et al. 2001) seem to have 
significantly abated. Nevertheless, the 
controversial issues that were raised 
in those disputes are, of course, far 
from settled or out-dated. Quite to the 
contrary, the questions concerning the 
changing relations of science and so-
ciety and the potential emergence of 
new forms of knowledge production 
and expertise, termed “socially robust 
knowledge” and “socially distributed 
expertise” by Nowotny et al. (2001), 
still are highly relevant for STS. Giv-
en this background, the publication 
of Monika Kurath’s (2009) and Janus 
Hansen’s (2009) papers in the last issue 
of STI-Studies offers a good chance 
to reconsider these issues from some 
temporal distance. In my comment, I 
will make some remarks on how the 
mode 2 thesis is addressed and criti-
cised in each of the two papers and 
then, in my short conclusion, argue for 
a primarily heuristic use of this thesis 
and the concepts mentioned above.
Nanotechnology governance – 
without socially robust knowl-
edge?
In her paper on  “Nanotechnology Go-
vernance”, Monika Kurath, uses the 
concept of “socially robust knowl-
edge” in order to examine to which 
extent the alleged “governance turn” 
in recent science and technology poli-
cies is actually linked with greater ac-
countability and public participation. 
While there is obviously much talk 
of “public engagement” or “responsi-
ble technology development” in the 
field of nanosciences and nanotech-
nologies (NST), Kurath’s comparative 
analysis of 14 self-regulatory and soft 
law schemes and six public engage-
ment projects presents rather disil-
lusioning results. With regard to the 
mode 2 thesis it appears to be partic-
ularly alarming that the soft law and 
self-regulatory initiatives “considered 
little societal knowledge (…) and were 
rarely subject to external evaluation, 
testing, and improvement” (Kurath 
2009: 101) and, similarly, most of the 
public engagement projects were still 
shaped by “the notion of a boundary 
separating science and the public into 
two societal actors on either side of 
an expert/lay divide” (Kurath 2009: 
101-102).
These findings seem to explicitly con-
tradict or even refute one of the core 
assumptions of the mode 2 thesis: the 
assertion of a shift from the produc-
tion of scientifically reliable to socially 
robust knowledge. The latter is char-
acterised by Nowotny et al. (2001: 
167), besides other criteria, as “infil-
trated and improved by social knowl-
edge” and subject to frequent testing, 
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feedback and evaluation by a variety 
of actors. I would, however, suggest 
that what is undermined by Kurath’s 
findings is first and foremost a certain 
evolutionist interpretation of changes 
in the relationships of science and 
society, of expert and lay actors. This 
reading which apparently is supported 
by the mode 2 authors themselves re-
lies on the co-evolution of “mode 2 sci-
ence” and “mode 2 society” (Nowotny 
et al. 2001: 30-49) which is held to 
result in convergent trends within the 
two spheres. It thus underestimates 
the essentially political, i.e. contingent 
and contested nature of new modes 
of producing and evaluating (scien-
tific) knowledge.1 If one abandons the 
questionable background assump-
tions of co-evolutionary “coincidenc-
es and correspondences” (Nowotny 
et al. 2001: 30) between science and 
society, one gets a more differenti-
ated understanding of the shift from 
reliable to socially robust knowledge 
and its limitations. It becomes clear 
then that the extent to which environ-
mental and consumer organizations 
or “ordinary” citizens are involved 
in the production and assessment of 
knowledge primarily depends on the 
openness of institutional settings and 
policy arenas as well as on the pow-
er relations of different actor groups. 
Thus, even in the field of NST, where 
upstream public engagement recently 
became “a fashionable term in sci-
ence communication” (Kurath 2009: 
89), it seems to be the rule rather than 
the exception that established actors 
only pay lip service to the rhetoric of 
public participation. Nevertheless, Ku-
rath’s analysis also shows that some 
of the employed governance mecha-
nisms, mainly in the UK, actually did 
“provide a substantial level of ex-
change and mutual learning” (Kurath 
2009: 101). In addition, the fact that 
– after the GMO disaster in Europe – 
governments in almost all Western 
countries feel obliged to adopt at least 
1  See for more detailed criticisms of this 
point Pestre 2003; Wehling 2006a.
the rhetoric of dialogue and public en-
gagement in their NST programmes is 
striking. This exemplarily highlights 
that the legimitation and acceptability 
of new science and emerging technol-
ogies become increasingly dependent 
on wider social processes in which a 
great variety of actors potentially play 
an important role.2 Since the concept 
of socially robust knowledge reflects 
such dynamics, it proves to be a use-
ful heuristic and analytical tool to 
study how new constellations of so-
cial actors emerge in relation to the 
production of knowledge.
But the extent to which scientific 
knowledge is in fact “infiltrated” by 
social knowledge and subject to ex-
ternal evaluation cannot be not pre-
determined on a theoretical level but 
has to be established empirically. Ku-
rath’s study thus confirms the heuris-
tic fruitfulness of a central concept of 
the mode 2 thesis while her findings 
simultaneously challenge an inter-
pretation of this thesis in terms of an 
evolutionary master-trend from mode 
1 to mode 2, from reliable to socially 
robust knowledge. 
Rectifying mode 2 with Lumann?
Janus Hansen raises two more theo-
retically demanding objections to the 
mode 2 thesis. He, firstly, questions 
the assumption of a convergent and 
homogeneous transformation of all 
modern societies towards “mode 2 
societies”, an assumption which ac-
cording to Hansen is at least implicitly 
suggested by the work of Nowotny, 
Gibbons and colleagues. He rightly 
asks “how this implicit assumption of 
convergence can be transformed from 
2  Beyond the massive social conflicts over 
GMOs, there are indeed many more exam-
ples of the involvement of social actors in 
the production and assessment of (scien-
tific) knowledge. An illuminating case in 
point is the engagement of patients’ asso-
ciations and health movements in medical 
research; see for instance Epstein 1996; 
Rabeharisoa/Callon 2002; Brown 2007; 
McCormick 2009, and for an overview Ep-
stein 2008.
Peter Wehling: How to make the mode 2 thesis sociologically more robust? 77 
a conceptual a priori into a question 
suitable for theoretically grounded, em-
pirical examination” (Hansen 2009: 72) 
and argues for comparative, especially 
cross-national research in order to ac-
count for variations in different social 
contexts.3 It should be clear from my 
comments on Kurath’s paper as well 
as my earlier criticism of the model of 
co-evolution underlying “Re-Thinking 
Science” (Wehling 2006a) that I large-
ly agree with Hansen’s suggestion. 
Likewise, I have little doubt that the 
concept of “political culture” recently 
re-adopted by Sheila Jasanoff might 
prove fruitful in order to capture vari-
ations in the ways different societies 
deal with the challenges posed by sci-
entific knowledge and novel technolo-
gies (see Hansen 2009: 79-81). I would, 
however, like to add one qualification: 
cross-national comparisons will cer-
tainly remain important but no longer 
seem sufficient to fully understand the 
variety of forms in which knowledge 
is produced, legitimized and evalu-
ated in different cultural and political 
contexts. This is due not only to the di-
minishing influence of nation-states on 
globalizing economies and sciences, 
but also to the fact that international 
or transnational institutions play an 
increasingly important role in shaping 
research and innnovation policies and 
in regulating science and technology.4 
Cross-national comparisons therefore 
have to be complemented with com-
parative research into the institution-
al cultures of different transnational 
organizations as well as with what 
I would term “cross-technological” 
comparisons. Nanotechnology, for in-
stance, is framed and institutionally 
3  One could reasonably argue that this is 
exactly what Kurath does in her paper. I 
presume, however, that Hansen argues for 
more detailed, qualitative research than 
Kurath’s rating of social robustness along a 
numerical classification. 
4  Among the sample of 20 nanotechnology 
governance projects analyzed by Kurath 
five are launched by supranational (EU) or 
international bodies (OECD) and another 
five by private actors.
dealt with similarly in many countries, 
but quite differently from other tech-
nologies such as agrobiotechnology or 
human genetics and biomedicine.
Hansen’s second criticism of the mode 
2 concept is in my view much less con-
vincing than his call for comparative 
research. Opposing the mode 2 claims 
of “dissolving boundaries between 
science and society” or even societal 
de-differentiation, Hansen resorts to 
Luhmann’s theory of social systems 
with a twofold aim: On the one hand, 
he adheres to “socially significant dis-
tinctions” which, according to Hansen 
(2009: 74) “should not be overlooked 
or abandoned for both analytical and 
normative reasons”, namely the dis-
tinctions between science as a func-
tionally specialised (sub-)system and 
society or other subsystems such as 
politics or economy. As is well known, 
according to Luhmann, science con-
stitutes an autonomous subsystem by 
exclusively referring in its communica-
tive operations to the binary distinction 
of true vs. false. On the other hand, 
Hansen calls for greater attention to 
the differences between “two levels 
of social reality”, namely science as 
a subsystem of society and organiza-
tions such as universities or industrial 
R&D departments which operate with 
reference to more than one subsys-
temic code (Hansen 2009: 76). While it 
is certainly true that in “New Produc-
tion of Knowledge” and “Re-Thinking 
Society” de-differentiation often is too 
hastily proclaimed and levels of analy-
sis are not clearly separated, I have se-
rious doubts whether Luhmann’s theo-
ry provides a perspective to adequately 
capture the complex and flexible rela-
tions of science to the state, the econ-
omy, the media and the public in con-
temporary societies. I rather suspect 
that systems theory draws too static a 
picture of science as a self-referential 
communication system the “core” of 
which (the true-false distinction) is by 
definition immune to transformations.
Although this point would certainly 
deserve much more detailed elabora-
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tion, I can only very briefly sketch the 
argument here. Even if one admits 
that scientific communication “in the 
final instance” (Hansen 2009: 75) re-
curs upon a distinction between true 
and false, one should acknowledge 
that this conception of scientific com-
munication is equally restrictive and 
selective. In particular, it remains un-
specific with regard to a great number 
of issues which are exceedingly im-
portant both for the dynamics of sci-
ence and the relations of science and 
society but cannot be meaningfully ex-
pressed in terms of true or false – and, 
at the same time, offer various oppor-
tunities for the engagement of non-
scientific actors. A pertinent example 
is the choice of research questions 
and priorities which obviously cannot 
be judged as true or false but merely 
as more or less interesting, promis-
ing or relevant. Therefore it is hardly 
surprising that a broad range of actors 
(from politics, economy, civil society 
and the like) strive to influence, often 
successfully, the research agenda of 
science. A second case in point is the 
scientific creation and subsequent dif-
fusion of new entities such as GMOs, 
embryonic stem-cells, nanoparticles 
or human-animal chimaeras. Again, 
the question is not whether these en-
tities are “true” or “false” but whether 
it is considered acceptable, in terms 
of risk or ethical justification, to cre-
ate, utilize and release such entities. 
And again, social actors massively 
intervene in discussions on such is-
sues, as the fierce conflicts over agro-
biotechnology or stem cell research 
show. Further examples are the de-
bates on unknown and unforeseeable 
risks which result in a remarkable 
“politicization of non-knowledge” (cf. 
Wehling 2006b; Böschen et al. 2010) 
or conflicts over the design of clini-
cal drug tests and safety research on 
GMOs. In all these cases, important 
areas of scientific communication (or 
scientific practice, as I would prefer to 
say) are (potentially) opened to nego-
tiations with a variety of actors, thus 
confirming the heuristic and analyti-
cal relevance of concepts such as “so-
cially robust knowledge” or “socially 
distributed expertise”. Yet, what is not 
contested in all these cases is that sci-
entific communication is (or should 
be) about truth; what is debated and 
transformed, however, are the social 
contexts and the ways in which ques-
tions of true or false are addressed.
To put the argument briefly: With re-
gard to the relations between society 
and science and to emerging new 
modes of knowledge production in 
contemporary modernity, the ques-
tion of whether or not de-differentia-
tion occurs on the very general level 
of binary codes of communication is 
less important than most Luhmann-
ians as well as many of their critics 
usually believe. Instead, the focus on 
functional differentiation or de-dif-
ferentiation tends to distract our at-
tention from the far more significant 
developments on the “lower” levels of 
social reality. Thus the occasional talk 
of de-differentiation in the work of 
Nowotny and colleagues is sociologi-
cally less informative than the many 
examples they give of how the institu-
tionally fixed and stabilized “bounda-
ries” between science and society are 
contested, permeated, transgressed, 
and reconstructed.5
Conclusion
Both papers inspiringly contribute to 
renewing the debates on the mode 2 
thesis. They do not only point to its 
limitations but also sketch out promis-
ing perspectives to overcome some of 
these limitations, for instance by com-
parative research focusing on how the 
supposedly new relations between 
science and society differ across na-
tional, cultural, or institutional con-
texts. I suggest to conclude that the 
5  I agree with Hansen that the differences 
between science (or scientific practices) 
and, for instance, economic or political ac-
tion are also normatively significant; yet it 
is far from self-evident what practical con-
sequences should be drawn from this fact.
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mode 2 thesis should be understood 
and used as a “tool-box” of inspiring 
and sensitizing concepts (such as “so-
cially robust knowledge”) rather than 
as a (sociological) theory of “mode 2 
science” and “mode 2 society”. Nev-
ertheless, contrary to Hansen, I do not 
see the need nor the benefit of rem-
edying the weaknesses of the mode 
2 thesis by resorting to Luhmann’s 
systems theory, for this theory with its 
focus on the utterly abstract distinc-
tion of true and false has little to offer 
to adequately understand those new 
modes of interaction between science 
and society to which the mode 2 the-
sis has successfully drawn our atten-
tion.
References
Böschen, Stefan/Karen Kastenhofer/Ina 
Rust/Jens Soentgen/Peter Wehling, 
2010: Scientific Non-Knowledge and Its 
Political Dynamics. The Cases of Agro-
biotechnology and Mobile Phoning. In: 
Science, Technology and Human Values 
35 (in press).
Brown, Phil, 2007: Toxic Exposures. Con-
tested illnesses and the environmental 
health movement. New York: Columbia 
University Press. 
Epstein, Steven, 1996: Impure Science. 
AIDS, Activism, and the Politics of Knowl-
edge. Berkeley: University of California 
Press.
Epstein, Steven, 2008: Patient Groups and 
Health Movements. In: Edward J. Hack-
ett et al. (eds.): The Handbook of Science 
and Technology Studies. Third edition, 
Cambridge, MA./London: MIT Press: 
499-539.
Gibbons, Michael et al., 1994: The New 
Production of Knowledge. London: SAGE 
Publications.
Hansen, Janus, 2009: Mode 2, Systems Dif-
ferentiation and the Significance of Po-
litico-Cultural Variety. In: Science, Tech-
nology & Innovation Studies 5(2): 67-85.
Kurath, Monika, 2009: Nanotechnology 
Governance. In: Science, Technology & 
Innovation Studies 5(2): 87-110.
McCormick, Sabrina, 2009: Mobilizing Sci-
ence. Movements, Participation, and the 
Remaking of Knowledge. Philadelphia: 
Temple University Press.
Nowotny, Helga/Peter Scott/Michael Gib-
bons, 2001: Re-Thinking Science. Cam-
bridge: Polity Press.
Pestre, Dominique, 2003: Regimes of 
Knowledge Production in Society: to-
wards a More Political and Social Read-
ing. In: Minerva 41: 245-261
Rabeharisoa, Vololona/Michel Callon, 
2002: The involvement of patients’ as-
sociations in research. In: International 
Social Science Journal 54(3): 57-65.
Wehling, Peter, 2006a: Sozial robuste Wis-
senschaft in der Modus 2-Gesellschaft? 
In: Soziologische Revue 29: 257-264.
Wehling, Peter, 2006b: Im Schatten des 
Wissens? Perspektiven der Soziologie des 
Nichtwissens. Konstanz: UVK.
 
 
 
Science, Technology & Innovation Studies  
Vol. 6, No. 1, August 2010
ISSN: 1861-3675
STI
Studies
www.sti-studies.de
Social robustness as analytical tool or  
normative standard?
A comment on Monika Kurath „Nanotechnology Governance. 
Accountability and Democracy in New Modes of Regulation and 
Debate“
Janus Hansen (Copenhagen Business School, Denmark)
A recent issue of STI-Studies (vol. 5, 
no. 2) contained two articles, which 
both addressed the so-called ‘Mode 
2-diagnosis’ by Nowotny et al. (2001). 
In particular, they both made refer-
ence to the affiliated concept of ‘so-
cial robustness’. Given this topical 
overlap, the editors of STI-Studies 
encouraged the authors of the two 
articles to provide comments on each 
other’s paper. My own paper (Hansen 
2009) is concerned primarily with the 
theoretical consistency and analytical 
value of the concept of ‘social robust-
ness’ for comparative analysis of pub-
lic engagement processes, and was 
conceived as an attempt to lay a con-
ceptual ground for ongoing empirical 
work. In this respect, Monica Kurath’s 
paper is ahead of mine, as it presents 
a completed comparative study of na-
no-science governance based on the 
concept of social robustness (Kurath 
2009). In my view, Kurath’s paper thus 
constitutes a fruitful step beyond my 
own reflections. I am pleased to note 
that her analysis indeed addresses a 
number of the dimensions I suggest 
as central for empirical inquiries in 
the final pages of my paper, such as 
institutional embedding, procedural 
design, and discursive dynamics, and 
does so in a grounded and hands-on 
manner. However, her more opera-
tional approach to questions I pose 
only at an abstract and analytical 
level also illustrates some of the ca-
veats I believe are entailed in apply-
ing the concept of ‘social robustness’ 
for comparative empirical analysis. I 
shall discuss some of these in the fol-
lowing. However, I should emphasize 
that I am keenly aware that Kurath 
has faced the more challenging task 
of leaving the academic office and 
confront theories with actual, social 
practice. This inevitably makes mat-
ters more complicated compared to 
isolated theoretical reflection. There-
fore, the following comments should 
be read as constructive suggestions 
for further work, not as a polemic 
against the work done by Kurath.
I divide my comments in three sec-
tions: The first one deals with the 
epistemological status of the concept 
of ‘social robustness’. The second per-
tains to the comparability of the cases 
presented in Kurath’s paper. The third 
regards the question of how more 
explanatory or interpretive value can 
be gained from analyzing this kind of 
material. However, I shall start with a 
preliminary observation on Kurath’s 
adoption of the concept of social ro-
bustness. 
Originally, the term ‘social robust-
ness’ in the Mode 2 diagnosis pertains 
to novel demands made on (academic) 
knowledge production from the sur-
rounding society (claiming that the 
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borders between scientific knowledge 
production and ‘society’ are eroding). 
Kurath moves the application of the 
concept from the domain of (scientif-
ic) knowledge production to the realm 
of (nano-science) governance. She ar-
gues that “The openness of social ro-
bustness well matches the analytical 
needs of a study of societal processes 
or activities beyond science and aca-
demic knowledge production that in-
clude regulation, deliberation, public 
engagement and governance” (ibid. 
90). I consider this move unproblem-
atic. In fact, perhaps the concept is 
more suitable in the realm of govern-
ance than in knowledge production 
per se. However, with this move the 
concept also loses its radical edge, 
when compared to other conceptual-
izations of the interface between sci-
ence and society. Some of the appeal 
– but also much of the provocation  – 
of the Mode 2 thesis lies in the claim 
that the ‘epistemological core’ of con-
temporary science is empty (Nowotny 
et al. 2001; 179). This claim is impor-
tant as normative underpinning of the 
calls for a reconfigured and less hier-
archical interaction between experts 
and lay-people. Kurath thus navigated 
around some of the epistemological 
intricacies affiliated with the Mode 2 
diagnosis by looking ‘only’ at govern-
ance, as it is much less controversial 
to claim that governance of science – 
as opposed to science proper  – must 
be open to inputs from the outside, 
in order to be ‘socially robust’. None-
theless, my first comment regards the 
epistemological status of the concept 
of social robustness, but from a slight-
ly different angle.
Social robustness – empirical re-
ality of normative standard?
Some of the criticism that has been 
leveled against the Mode 2 diagnosis 
pertains exactly to its epistemological 
status (e.g. Shinn 2002). The authors 
have been criticized for oscillating 
between, on the one hand, claiming 
to describe a shift from a Mode 1 to 
a Mode 2 knowledge production, as a 
set of ongoing social processes (em-
pirical reality), on the one hand, and 
presenting a normative standard on 
the other, an ideal to be aimed for in 
order to stimulate innovation, miti-
gate risks and enhance legitimacy of 
techno-scientific development.1 Ku-
rath decisively opts for the second op-
tion and makes ‘social robustness’ the 
normative standard against which her 
cases are measured. She constructs 
a social robustness-index composed 
of measures of five analytical dimen-
sions (‘contextualization’, ‘stability’, 
‘acceptability’, ‘social knowledge’ 
and ‘evaluation’). Also, this choice is 
a perfectly legitimate move, although 
the methodological aspects of the in-
dex construction and scores can be 
discussed.2 In my eyes, however, this 
use of the concept of social robust-
ness raises two questions, which are 
not addressed in Kurath’s paper. The 
first has to do with how we interpret 
the performance or ‘compliance’ with 
the standard. The second has to do 
with why this particular standard in 
this particular operationalization is 
selected and how it relates to other 
possible standards, which could per-
haps be applied in an equally mean-
ingful manner to assess the cases. 
Out of the total of 20 either ‘regula-
tory’ or ‘public-engaging’ events or 
processes analysed in the paper, most 
score rather poorly on the social ro-
bustness-index. According to Kurath 
1  As I noted in my paper, the Mode 2 
thesis seems in particular to be embraced 
by policy makers for its normative 
implications, rather than its empirical 
substantiation, a point that seems to be 
supported by Kurath’s findings.
2  The social robustness index consists of 5 
components, which are each assigned one 
of three values (-1, 0, 1, but also at some 
point 0.5) and summed. The score system, 
the fact that the five dimensions are given 
the same weight and the principles of score 
assignments, are all issues that could be 
given further consideration. However, 
I accept that for the sake of simplicity 
pragmatic choices need to be made.
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this is a cause for concern regarding 
the democratic accountability of the 
resulting governance of nano-sci-
ence. I concur this is a valid and per-
tinent concern. However, this result 
could also lead us to question the vi-
ability of the concept of social robust-
ness from an analytic rather than a 
normative angle. We could ask em-
pirically whether ‘social robustness’ is 
in fact a good tool to grasp the em-
pirical reality of those processes. The 
very mixed scores on the index could 
thus be used to question the empiri-
cal viability of Nowotny et al.’s claim 
that we are moving towards a Mode 2 
relationship between science and so-
ciety. Perhaps some of the processes 
were instigated with entirely different 
purposes than achieving ‘social ro-
bustness’ as envisioned in the Mode 
2 thesis. In that case, a low score on 
the social robustness-index may not 
be an entirely fair or relevant evalu-
ation of the processes and organiza-
tions examined, and we may need 
other tools to get an analytical grip on 
the intrinsic dynamics and external 
effects of these processes. 
When it comes to public engage-
ment with technology alone (a sub-
set of Kurath’s cases) there is a lively 
discussion on how best to evaluate 
such processes.3 Kurath’s social ro-
bustness index might benefit from 
being confronted, compared or sup-
plemented with other evaluative cri-
teria discussed in the literature (see 
e.g. discussions in Rowe and Frewer 
2000, Renn et al. 1995, Abels and Bora 
2000, Horlick-Jones et al. 2007). When 
it comes to evaluation of ‘governance’ 
in the broader sense of processes that 
move beyond conventional ‘govern-
ment’, the number of frameworks and 
3 Personally, I think that there has 
been a tendency for the discussion on 
normative standards to take precedence 
over actual empirical analysis of public 
engagement activities, which means 
that the accumulation of knowledge and 
experiences across cases are less than 
satisfactory. 
approaches on offer are even more 
abundant (to name just one contri-
bution to this discussion, see Borrás 
and Conzelmann 2007). The point is 
not that the social robustness index is 
flawed, but it appears somewhat arbi-
trary and could be qualified through 
a more elaborate confrontation with 
normative and conceptual alterna-
tives, which might reorder the scores 
of the cases.
Rendering cases comparable, 
managing diversity
My second comment pertains to the 
comparability of the cases entailed 
in Kurath’s study. In my own paper 
I suggest that comparability is not 
an intrinsic characteristic of cases. 
Rather comparability must be estab-
lished through the researcher’s cali-
bration of the distinctions through 
which selected aspects of the social 
world are observed. Comparative re-
search therefore needs to balance the 
need for similarity (selecting cases of 
the same phenomenon) and distinc-
tiveness (ensuring enough variation 
is observable), in order to establish 
worthwhile comparisons. Kurath ar-
gues that her cases are similar-in-
kind in so far, as they are all examples 
of a novel approach to the regulation 
of nano-science. As such, all the cas-
es allegedly embody or express a gen-
eral shift from (hierarchical) ‘govern-
ment’ to (network-like or deliberative) 
‘governance’. I find this overall fram-
ing of the cases convincing enough 
for the present purpose. Yet, one may 
nonetheless wonder, if perhaps there 
is too much diversity among the se-
lected cases to make analytically 
fruitful comparisons. The cases are 
not only drawn from four different 
national, one supranational and one 
international context, they also span 
both public and private initiatives (or 
what should perhaps more appropri-
ately be labeled corporatist) and seem 
from the description in the annexes to 
have quite different aims, serve quite 
different purposes for their sponsors 
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and comprise very different modes of 
communication. As a consequence, 
Kurath furthermore distinguishes be-
tween cases as ‘soft law measures’, 
‘self-regulatory initiatives’ and ‘public 
engagement projects’. All in all, this 
amounts to quite a lot of variation on 
quite a lot of dimensions among the 
20 cases included in the study. As a 
consequence, it is not entirely clear 
what kind of lessons can be drawn 
from the performance scores assigned 
to the cases. In a next step it may per-
haps be recommendable to focus on 
a smaller subset of the cases, holding 
some of this variance constant, which 
would allow for more in-depth analy-
sis, including more contextual fea-
tures. This brings me to my third and 
final comment.
Learning from comparative 
analysis
In my paper I comment critically on 
the fact that a lot of research on pub-
lic engagement is either dealing with 
normative reflections or focusing nar-
rowly on single cases, thus ignoring 
the potential of comparative research. 
In my view, one strength of Kurath’s 
paper lies in the fact that it presents 
and compares a significant number of 
cases. However, processing such a rich 
material in a journal article comes at a 
price. In this case, the price is that the 
empirical sections of the paper have 
a largely descriptive and classificatory 
nature. This is perfectly respectable, 
but hopefully the effort will not be ter-
minated here. In a next step it would 
be nice to see more of an explana-
tory or interpretive effort, to account 
in more detail for (perhaps selected 
aspects of) the similarities and differ-
ences among the cases. How can the 
variance covered by the cases be in-
terpreted or explained? For instance, 
what difference does it make for a 
governance initiative whether it is or-
ganized by a private organization/as-
sociation compared to a state agency 
or an international organization? This 
will likely impinge on both the public 
legitimacy and the policy impact of 
the procedure. Similarly, is it possible 
to establish any (systematic) effects of 
the national context, in which the pro-
cedures are embedded? It seems rea-
sonable to expect that they are both 
shaped by and play into different insti-
tutional settings and political cultures. 
It is mentioned in a footnote (note 8, 
p. 91) that the aim of the study was to 
undertake a transatlantic comparison. 
But this comparative perspective does 
not really appear in the analysis. In 
my own paper I argue that systematic 
comparative analysis of processes of 
public engagement should form an 
important way forward in our under-
standing of the pros and cons of pub-
lic engagement. Therefore, I would 
welcome an attempt to further exam-
ine differences and similarities across 
the cases in a more interpretive and/
or explanatory fashion. The ambition 
is already present in the paper as Ku-
rath argues that 
“Questions will focus on the ways gover-
nance has been embedded in social, 
cultural, political and historic contexts, 
and their relations with current policy 
and technology discourses, which in-
clude environmental, health and safety 
(EHS) issues” (p. 91). 
However, one may wonder whether 
the operationalization of this dimen-
sion in questions about whether the 
regulatory schemes are based on 
‘standards’ or ‘principles’, and wheth-
er the public engagement processes 
are focused on ‘information provi-
sion’ or ‘deliberation’, actually pro-
vides enough information to address 
the question of contextualization sat-
isfactorily. In any case, the measure-
ment stops short of making any kind 
of causal inferences, which in my view 
should form a desirable next step. 
This may, however, require concep-
tual and methodological tools beyond 
what the Mode 2 framework delivers. 
Concluding remarks
Kurath summarises her analysis in the 
following manner: 
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“These findings contest the idea that de-
liberative governance projects and pub-
lic upstream engagement in NST exem-
plify a paradigm shift in techno-political 
discourse and will lead toward the more 
democratic development of technology 
that is advocated by proponents of the 
upstream engagement approach … In 
fact, governance projects still appear to 
limit public engagement to values, and 
social and ethical matters, rather than 
to expose expertise to scrutiny…” (p. 
102). 
I believe this conclusion is warranted 
and it corresponds well with my own 
observations and concerns regarding 
the actual impact of the discourses 
about expanded public engagement 
(e.g. Hansen 2010). It certainly should 
give rise to normative concerns when 
“political responsibility is distributed 
and deliberated among a variety of 
actors in different societal domains” 
(ibid.), but no actor or institution can 
be held democratically accountable. 
Indeed this would appear as an em-
pirically grounded example of Ulrich 
Beck’s catch phrase of ‘organized ir-
responsibility’ (Beck 1999). 
However, looking only at cases which 
supposedly embody this alleged new 
mode of governance we do not learn 
anything about what remains of con-
ventional ‘government’ in the field of 
nano-science. Do these novel pro-
cesses of governance replace conven-
tional government completely, or are 
they rather layered on top of a more 
conventional regulatory structure? If 
so, is this a good or a bad thing, given 
the somewhat questionable perfor-
mance of the processes surveyed for 
their ability to establish social robust-
ness? 
This last question may also serve as a 
call for conceptual and methodologi-
cal self-reflection. If we find that gov-
ernance processes do not deliver what 
some expect in terms of legitimacy 
and rationality gains, is it then neces-
sarily a sign that democratic control 
of techno-scientific dynamics is being 
undermined? Or is it perhaps an indi-
cation that existing institutions and 
organizational arrangements of gov-
ernance are more resilient than some 
scholars currently suggest.4 While we 
should certainly be aware of the kind 
of democratic problems identified by 
Kurath, we should also ask whether 
the government/governance distinc-
tion constitutes mutually exclusionary 
categories and whether the concept of 
social robustness is an adequate and 
sufficiently sensitive tool to analyse 
the ongoing developments at the in-
terface of techno-science, politics and 
the larger public. 
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Mode 2: Theory or Social Diagnosis?
A Comment on Janus Hansen „Mode 2, Systems Differentiation 
and the Significance of Politico-Cultural Variety“
Monika Kurath (University of Basel, Switzerland)
Janus Hansen’s essay examines in 
how far the Mode 2 concept (Gibbons 
et al. 1994, Nowotny et al. 2001) is ap-
plicable as a theoretical or analytical 
concept for a cross-national compari-
son of public engagement practices. 
Influenced by reflections on socially 
robust knowledge production and the 
role of science in society by Gibbons 
and Nowotny et al., Hansen begins his 
essay with the observation of a rising 
demand for public engagement (Gib-
bons et al. 1994, Nowotny et al. 2001). 
In the course of the article he con-
fronts the Mode 2 concept with com-
peting sociological approaches, in 
particular Luhmann’s systems theo-
retical approach (Luhmann 1984) and 
Jasanoff’s concept of political culture 
(Jasanoff 2005).
The article mainly focuses on a broad-
critical discussion of Mode 2, drawing 
upon the arguments of earlier diag-
noses (see e.g., Weingart 1997, 1999, 
Pestre 2000, 2003). In accord with 
them, Hansen argues that the Mode 
2 approach lacks a sufficient social-
theoretical grounding as well as a 
conceptually sharpened and sensitive 
tool for the analysis of politico-cultur-
al variety in science/society interac-
tion. Hansen claims that Mode 2 con-
veys an implicit thesis of convergence, 
seemingly suggesting that all modern 
societies are affected by similar trans-
formations. Relying on basic princi-
ples of systems theory (e.g. Luhmann 
1984 ), Hansen considers two aspects 
of the Mode 2 approach intrinsically 
problematic:
1) Mode 2 contests the theoretical as-
sumption of social differentiation 
and instead observes a transgres-
sion between different societal sys-
tems. 
2) It fails to distinguish analytically be-
tween changes on the sub-systemic 
and organizational level by relying 
on categories it claims are dissolv-
ing.
Although agreeing with the authors 
of Mode 2 and their observations of 
a transformation of science and aca-
demic knowledge production in the 
last 50 years—like Weingart and Pes-
tre—Hansen doubts whether the em-
pirical material Novotny et al. (2001) 
provide is sufficient to abandon well 
established basic principles of sys-
tems theory. While discussing Mode 2 
as a theoretical and analytical concept 
in the first part of the article, Hansen 
later suggests that Mode 2 might be 
conceived as a diagnosis of social 
transformation, which implies a nor-
mative claim for engaging the public 
in techno-scientific decision-making, 
rather than a conceptual basis for the-
oretical and empirical analysis.
Hansen’s vague differentiation in 
looking at Mode 2 both as a theoreti-
cal concept and as a social diagnosis 
remains a core problem throughout 
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the whole article. To initially define 
Mode 2 as a social diagnosis rather 
than a theoretical concept would have 
made most of the aspects criticized by 
Hansen less essential. Considered as 
a social diagnosis, speculative ideas 
such as the observation of converg-
ing social systems might have been 
discussed in more detail. By reading 
Mode 2 as a theoretical concept in-
stead, Hansen’s contention is correct 
that minimal consistency with ba-
sic principles of neighbouring social 
theories are necessary. However, in 
my reading of Mode 2 (Nowotny et 
al. 2001, 28, 32) the authors remain 
rather open to the question whether 
different social systems would really 
converge, or whether—according to 
Weingart’s observations—transfor-
mations such as a scientification of 
politics and a politicization of science 
would take place within the systems 
(Weingart 1983, 2001).
In order to avoid these conceptual in-
consistencies, Hansen suggests con-
sidering public engagement process-
es as poly-contextual organisations. 
Conceived in this way, engagement 
procedures can be compared by iden-
tifying similar overlying social trends 
having different local manifestations. 
As a theoretical tool which allows 
comparing engagement processes 
within the specific logics of their par-
ticular social systems and domains, 
Hansen introduces the concept of 
political culture developed by Sheila 
Jasanoff (Jasanoff 2005). He considers 
this concept a more fruitful analyti-
cal approach to a comparative analy-
sis of legitimating practices in public 
engagement procedures. Accordingly 
he claims that Jasanoff’s understand-
ing of political culture corresponds 
to systems-theoretical assumptions. 
Furthermore, Hansen regards the con-
cept as a helpful tool to observe and 
explain variation in the way public 
engagement is institutionalized and 
used in different national contexts 
and to empirically address questions 
of convergence or continued vari-
ety. Jasanoff’s use of political culture 
consists of three relevant analytical 
dimensions, along which a compara-
tive analysis of public involvement in 
techno-political decision making can 
be designed (Jasanoff 2005, 281): 
1) Representation: how voices are 
made audible in the political and 
policy process and how political in-
clusion in turn affects the framing 
of issues
2) Participation: who actually takes 
part in politics, and who does not
3) Deliberation: the discourses in 
which political debate is conduct-
ed, together with their limits and 
achievements
Hansen suggests that these three di-
mensions of political culture could 
serve as a tool to compare public en-
gagement procedures. This analytical 
approach, with which I agree, allows 
a comparative analysis of the specific 
patterns of interaction between differ-
ent societal domains, depending on 
their national and sectoral contexts. 
It distinguishes between societal sub-
systems as relatively stable discur-
sive environments and organizations, 
which may be more easily reconfig-
ured by analyzing representation, 
participation, and deliberation.
To analyze public engagement pro-
cesses—focusing on how they are 
shaped by their politico-cultural en-
vironments and in some cases con-
sciously tailored to fit the politico-
cultural contexts in which they unfold 
—Hansen suggests further compari-
son of public engagement procedures 
across different politico-cultural con-
texts. Because the success of engage-
ment processes is likely to depend 
upon their compatibility with the po-
litico-cultural context in which they 
operate, Hansen applies Jasanoff’s 
(2005) three analytical dimensions to 
specific research designs. But he sug-
gests furthermore that comparative 
analysis of public engagement pro-
cesses, with regard to their ability to 
generate socially robust innovation, 
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should be based upon three additional 
analytical dimensions (Hansen 2009, 
83): 
1) Institutional embedding: where 
and how public engagement proce-
dures are institutionally anchored 
2) Procedural design: which actors 
have been included/excluded from 
participation, and how interaction 
is organized and roles are defined 
and distributed
3) Discursive dynamic: the commu-
nicative resources relied upon and 
how they condition each other
However, as Jasanoff’s dimensions 
are already supposed to work as tools 
for the analysis of public involvement 
in technopolitical decision-making 
(Jasanoff 2005, 281), the added value 
of these latter dimensions remains 
unclear to me. From my point of view, 
Hansen’s institutional embedding 
somehow narrows the analytical per-
spective from organizations to institu-
tions and, at the same time, links it to 
neo-institutionalism, thereby induc-
ing analytical difficulties which result 
from these  multiple theoretical bases. 
The wording ‘procedural design’ im-
plies a focus on the organization and 
procedure of the participatory process 
but does not address Jasanoff’s origi-
nal question of inclusion/exclusion. 
What exactly is to be compared within 
the procedure and organization needs 
further specification. In addition, the 
concept of discursive dynamic lacks 
specificity and I do not see the value it 
adds to deliberation.
Summing it up I consider Hansen’s 
efforts to further develop existing 
analytical approaches in order to use 
them for the comparative analysis of 
public engagement procedures inter-
esting and fruitful. I would, however, 
have appreciated a more comprehen-
sive discussion of Jasanoff’s (2005) 
political culture approach and its ap-
plicability to the analysis of public en-
gagement procedures across different 
politico-cultural contexts. In particu-
lar, a more extensive discussion of 
Hansen’s three analytical dimensions 
is missing. Being clearer with respect 
to their exact focus, content, and com-
patibility with the suggested percep-
tion of public engagement processes 
as organizations might have offered 
interesting insights and hints at their 
added value compared to Jasanoff’s 
(2005) categories. This, instead of re-
visiting familiar criticism of Mode 2, 
could have fostered the progress of 
the still underutilized and arguably 
underdeveloped theoretical and ana-
lytical tools of comparative analysis in 
STS.
Prologue: Mode 2 as a theory 
or as a social diagnosis?
In the article following Hansen’s essay 
on Mode 2, I used social robustness 
from the Mode 2 framework as an an-
alytical concept, following Hansen’s 
suggestion to compare different in-
ternational governance and engage-
ment procedures in Nanotechnology. 
I found the criteria for social robust-
ness (Nowotny et al. 2001, 167) quite 
helpful and I did not encounter in my 
analysis conflicts of Mode 2 with ba-
sic assumptions of systems theory 
as described by Hansen. The criteria 
of social robustness seem sufficiently 
openly designed to allow a compari-
son of governance and engagement 
practices within their particular so-
cial, political, and cultural contexts. 
But using social robustness as an ana-
lytical tool did not facilitate a more in-
depth analysis of the discourses, prac-
tices, and implications of these new 
forms of governance and engagement 
processes. Also, their role in science 
and technology policy and their abil-
ity to frame techno-political decision-
making in different social, cultural, 
and political environments remained 
dissatisfying. From the rather narrow 
social robustness perspective, most 
approaches I analyzed did not meet 
their purpose of generating a more 
democratic and responsible science 
and technology policy. Thus, the em-
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pirical test of using Mode 2 and par-
ticularly the related idea of social ro-
bustness as an analytical category in 
a comparative study produced some 
interesting results, but their utility did 
not necessarily exceed that of a deficit 
analysis. 
This supports the proposal of sever-
al critics, including Hansen, to treat 
Mode 2 and the idea of social robust-
ness as a social diagnosis rather than 
a theoretical concept. In this respect, 
I agree with Hansen’s suggestion to 
base comparative analysis on related, 
but further developed theoretical and 
analytical approaches. Jasanoff’s con-
cept of political culture clearly offers 
a more comprehensive and elaborate 
tool than Mode 2 and social robust-
ness.
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